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INTRODUCTION

The intersection of environmental law and bankruptcy law is a
ragged one. In the last dozen years, the United States Congress and
many state legislatures have enacted comprehensive legislation regarding toxic substances.' The cleanup liability created by this legislation
often renders businesses or individuals insolvent. Although the United
States Supreme Court has decided two cases involving environmental
obligations in the bankruptcy context, 2 many issues regarding the
treatment of environmental claims in bankruptcy continue to perplex
the courts. Indeed, the recent conflicting Courts of Appeals decisions
3
illustrate this confusion.
This article examines the problems confronting courts dealing with
environmental obligations in bankruptcy. It provides a framework for
analyzing these problems. The article focuses primarily on judicial and
statutory treatment of the cleanup obligation and resolves the attendant confusion. In particular, federal courts hearing these cases have
had to address two issues essential to understanding the appropriate
treatment of environmental obligations in bankruptcy: (1) Is the particular obligation a "claim ' 4 within the meaning of the Bankruptcy
Code 5 and, (2) If so, when did the claim "arise?" If a cleanup obligation
is held to be a claim that arose before the debtor filed for bankruptcy
(a pre-petition claim), then the holder of the obligation may participate
in the bankruptcy proceeding and share in any distribution of assets.
However, the obligation holder will not be allowed to pursue the
debtor post-bankruptcy. On the other hand, if a court holds the cleanup
obligation either not to be a claim or not to have arisen pre-petition,
then the obligation holder will not be allowed to participate in the

1. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Resource Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1992); Michigan Comp. Laws §§ 299.601-.618 (Supp. 1991).
2. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986);
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 ([985).
3. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 152-78 and 217-19); United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988)
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 130-51). District courts and one Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel have considered these questions too, with varying results. See infra text accompanying
notes 179-90 and 220-56.
4. The term "claim" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code],
which is quoted in full infra text accompanying note 63. Prior to 1991, this section was Bankruptcy
Code § 101(4), and most cases refer to Bankruptcy Code § 101(4). The definition itself remains
unchanged.
5. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330 (1988)).
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bankruptcy proceeding or share in any distribution. However, the
obligation holder will be allowed to seek redress from the debtor
post-bankruptcy.
The conceptually complex nature of cleanup obligations prevents
them from fitting neatly into Bankruptcy Code categories. Congress
created these categories to fit traditional and simpler obligations such
as basic torts, contracts, etc.; they were fashioned before the onslaught
of mass tort cases and extensive environmental liability.
The ambiguity of the Code and the attendant judicial confusion
create differing possible treatments of environmental obligations. Consequently, both debtors and holders of such obligations may be forced
to maintain different positions in otherwise similar cases in order to
maximize recovery. For example, the federal and state environmental
protection agencies, which are the usual obligation holders, may have
to maintain inconsistent positions in cases with identical environmental
obligations. The position maintained in a particular case can depend
more on the type of bankruptcy proceeding and the perceived degree
of post-bankruptcy debtor solvency than on the nature of the obligation
itself.
This situation is untenable. Either the United States Supreme
Court or the United States Congress must resolve definitively the
issue of the proper status of environmental claims in bankruptcy proceedings.
Part I of this article examines these issues and their effect in the
context of both the Bankruptcy Code and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 6 the
primary federal legislation under which the federal government acquires the right to recover environmental cleanup costs and damages
from various parties. Part II provides a framework or methodology
for distinguishing among the different sorts of environmental obligations that arise in bankruptcy proceedings, 7 and suggests legislative
solutions to these problems. Part III reviews and analyzes the relevant
cases. Finally, part IV distills and condenses the framework developed
throughout the article for considering environmental claims in bankruptcy. Charts help to fit these new complex obligations into the
existing categories Congress has given us in the Bankruptcy Code.

6. CEROLA §§ 9601-9675.
7. Although commentators have discussed various issues concerning environmental obligations in bankruptcy proceedings, none have provided a comprehensive analysis on these two
fundamental issues nor have they provided a comprehensive framework for considering these
issues. See, e.g., infra notes 23, 36, 54, 60, 73, 124 and accompanying text.
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STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Environmental Statutes

In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA with the primary goals of (1)
identifying and cleaning up toxic waste sites" and (2) placing the
cleanup cost on persons responsible for the contamination. 9 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was already in effect
when CERCLA was enacted.1' RCRA provides mechanisms and enforcement procedures to track toxic substances from the time of their
manufacture until the time of their use or disposition.,, In addition to

CERCLA and RCRA, other current federal statutes impose liability
for other environmental harms.12 State legislatures also have enacted
a wide variety of laws, including some that mimic the federal laws
and others that contain stricter enforcement measures. 13 This section
will describe the system established by CERCLA, since liability under
CERCLA (or its state-level counterpart) often is the basis of environmental obligations in bankruptcy. Other environmental statutes will
be noted in connection with a particular case when relevant to that
case.

CERCLA places responsibility for toxic waste site cleanup on (1)
the current "owner" or "operator" of the site,' 4 (2) the "owner" or
"operator" of the site at the time of the contamination, (3) the person
who arranged for the disposal of the waste, and (4) the person who
transported the waste to the site.' 5 A person within one of these

8. H.R. REP. No. 1016, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119-20, 6128.
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1992). Today, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) also requires cleanup efforts in some cases. For a discussion of the RCRA cleanup
scheme as compared with CERCLA, see Richard G. Stoll, The New RCRA Cleanup Regime:
Comparisons and Contrasts unth CERCLA, 44 Sw. L.J. 1299 (1991).
11. RCRA §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328.
13. Environmental Response Act, 1982 PA 307, Michigan Comp. Laws §§ 299.601-.618
(Supp. 1991).
14. CERCLA § 9607(a)(1). In some cases courts have held creditors and shareholders to
be within the provision imposing cleanup liability on owners and operators. See also Note,
Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest

Exception, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (1991); Kathryn R. Heidt, Liability of Shareholders Under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 133 (1991).

15.

CERCLA §§ 9607(a)(1)-(4).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss2/1
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referred to as a "responsible party" or "potentially
categories often is ' '16
responsible party.
Cleanup responsibility can be enforced in three ways. First, the
federal government, through the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), may clean up the site and then seek reimbursement from a
responsible party. 17 Second, under CERCLA, a state or other person
may perform the cleanup and then attempt to recover from a responsible party."' Third, in some cases, the federal government may order

a responsible party to clean up a site. 19
B.

Bankruptcy Code2

The bankruptcy system provides a "fresh start" for individual deb-

tors by discharging most or all of their debts. 21 The debts of a non-individual debtor are discharged if the debtor reorganizes under Chapter

16. Id. § 9607(c)(1). "Responsible parties" or "potentially responsible parties" are not defined
terms in CERCLA, but are standard terms used by the government and others. See also EPA
Management Review of the Superfund Program, App. III, at 3 (1989).
17. CERCLA §§ 9604(a)(1), 9607(a). Congress established the "Hazardous Substance Superfund" which pays for the initial clean-up. Any recovery from a person responsible for the clean-up
is then added back into the Superfund. The Superfund is established pursuant to I.R.C. § 9507
(1988). The Superfund is funded by a general corporate tax, taxes on the sale of specified
chemicals, taxes on the import of petroleum, and some appropriations from the general revenues.
I.R.C. §§ 59(A), 9507, 4611, 4661, 4671 (1988); CERCLA § 9611(P).
18. CERCLA §§ 9604(a)(1) & 9607(a). As a result, several cases have involved individuals
or corporations, rather than governmental units, who seek to recover from the debtor. State
statutes may also give the state or other parties the right to recover from a person responsible
for the contamination.
19. Id. § 9606.
20. The scope and nature of bankruptcy law has provoked much debate. See, e.g., THOMAS
H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986); Douglas G. Baird, Loss
Distribution,Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815
(1987); Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1987, at 173; James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990);
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987). For a summary of
portions of this debate, see Kathryn R. Heidt, Interest Under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code: The Right, the Rate and the Relationship to Bankruptcy Policy, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 361.
Recently, a new round of debate concerning Chapter 11 of the Code has been sparked by
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J.
1043 (1992). Forthcoming responses include those from Lynn M. LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren.
21. Bankruptcy Code §§ 727(a), (b); see also infra note 22. For a basic overview of all of
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that can affect environmental obligations, see Thomas
J. Bois, FinancialResponsibilityfor Environmental Liabilities, 18 W. ST. U. L. REV. 183
(1990).
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11.- The Bankruptcy Code cancels liabilities created elsewhere, such
as in the law of torts, contracts or CERCLA.- When a debtor receives
a discharge, all obligations are discharged unless an obligation is (1)
outside the definition of "claim" and "debt" or (2) specifically included
as an exception to discharge. 4
1. Definitions and Timing: "Claims," "Debts," and "Creditors"
The structure of the Bankruptcy Code, the availability of different
types of relief for different types of debtors, and some of the technical
definitions can lead to anomalous results. The same creditor may be
forced to maintain different positions in essentially identical cases.
This is a result of the meaning of and the interplay among certain
operative provisions of the Code and the terms "claim," "debt," and
"creditor." Consequently, appropriate interpretation of these terms
and operative provisions is central to devising a coherent and comprehensive framework in which to analyze the obligations of responsible parties under the Bankruptcy Code.
Generally, one who holds a "claim" participates in the bankruptcy
proceeding and in the bankruptcy distribution. In Chapter 11 proceedings, those with "claims" can vote on a plan of reorganization.2 They
have certain rights and are afforded certain protections in both the
proceeding and the resulting distribution. 26 In Chapter 7 bankruptcy

22. Bankruptcy Code § 1141(d)(1). In addition, a corporation that qualifies as a "family
farmer" may obtain a discharge under § 1228 (a); see id. §§ 101(17)(B), 101(18) & 109(f).
23. Some commentators assert that an unintended "conflict" exists between the Bankruptcy
Code and CERCLA or other environmental laws. See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of
Envtl. Resources, 733 F,2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984); Linda Johannsen, Note, United States v. Whizco,
Inc.: A FurtherRefinement of the Conflict Between Bankruptcy Discharge and Environmental
Cleanup Obligations, 20 ENVTL. L. 207 (1990). This view is incorrect; the conflict is not merely
the product of oversight. A more appropriate view is that the policies behind the bankruptcy
rules conflict fundamentally with the policies behind the environmental statutes.
Several commentators and at least one court have recognized that the statutes' purposes
compete. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); Van Patten Piretz,
Bankruptcy and Environmental Obligations: The Clash Between Private Relief and Public
Policy, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 200, 220-23 (1991).
24. Specific exceptions to discharge are listed in Bankruptcy Code §§ 523(a) and 1223(a).
An individual will fail to receive a discharge at all if his conduct brings him within id. § 727(a).
25. Id. § 1126(a).
26. The plan of reorganization must designate classes of claims and specify the treatment
that each class of claims is to receive under the plan of reorganization. Id. § 1123(a)(1), (3).
The plan must also provide for minimum treatment for a holder of a claim, as specified id. §
1129(a)(7). The plan must give classes of claims certain other rights. See, e.g., id. § 1129(b).
Shareholders may also participate in the proceeding if a sufficient amount of assets exists
to pay all the claimholders. See, e.g., id. § 726(a)(5). Shareholders' rights are referred to as
"interests" and not "claims." See id. § 501(a).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss2/1
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proceedings, those who hold a "claim" merely share in the distribution.27

In all bankruptcy proceedings, only "debts" are discharged.2 The
Bankruptcy Code defines a "debt" as a "liability on a claim."- Thus,
only obligations within the definition of "claim" are "debts" and subject
to the bankruptcy discharge. The Code's definition of "claim" and the
interpretation of that definition therefore are crucial in sorting out
environmental claims in bankruptcy.
Having a "claim" may be an advantage or a disadvantage, depending on the type of debtor and the type of bankruptcy proceeding
involved. 0 If an obligation is not a claim, it is not a debt and is not
discharged. If the debtor is an individual with a potentially productive
future, the claimant may be able to recover from the debtor in the
future. Thus, a government that holds a cleanup obligation may argue
that the debtor's obligation is not within the definition of "claim."
Therefore, the obligation is not a "debt," and not dischargeable. The
State of Ohio unsuccessfully made this argument in Ohio v. Kovacs3 1
On the other hand, if the debtor is a corporation that is liquidating
in Chapter 7, the government's best chance to recover is to share in
the distribution. Indeed, since nothing will remain after the Chapter
7 proceeding is concluded, this is possibly the government's only chance
to recover.m Thus, in a Chapter 7 corporate proceeding, the government should assert that the debtor's obligation is a "claim." If the
corporation is liquidating pursuant to Chapter 11, the position of the
government would be the same.
However, if the corporation is reorganizing under Chapter 11, the
government's position will depend on its prognosis for the reorganization. If the plan of reorganization appears likely to succeed and pro-

27. Id. § 726(a)(1)-(4).
28. Id. §§ 727(b), 1141(d)(1)(A), 1328(a). Some exceptions to discharge exist. See, e.g., id. §§
727(a), 523(a), 1328(a).
29. Id. § 101(12).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 32-36.
31. 469 U.S. 274 (1985). This case is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 85-98.
32. The corporation will not receive a discharge in a Chapter 7 case. Bankruptcy Code §
727(a)(1). Since it is liquidating, nothing will remain after the bankruptcy proceeding except
perhaps a corporate shell which contains liabilities.
33. See Bankruptcy Code § 726(a)(1). If the government does not pursue its claim immediately and share in the Chapter 7 distribution, it may or may not be able to recover in the
future depending on whether the debtor has set aside funds to pay unknown or contingent
claims as sometimes required by state corporation laws. This also leaves aside for the moment
the question of whether the government can assert the obligation owed to it as an administrative
expense.
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poses to pay all claimants fully and quickly, the government may prefer
to be considered to have a "claim" and receive that payment.4 On the
other hand, the government may argue that it holds no "claim," and
thus no dischargeable "debt," under the following circumstances: (1)
the plan proposes to give claimants stock for their claims, or payment
over many years, or anything less than full compensation, and (2) the
reorganized company could cleanup if required. If the government
successfully argues that the cleanup obligation was not a claim, the
obligation thus would be enforceable after the bankruptcy against the
reorganized debtor. The obligation would not be subject to the terms
of the plan of reorganization. However, if this enforceable cleanup
obligation would hinder the viability of the corporation post-confirmation, then the other pre-petition creditors may not approve the plan
of reorganization. Consequently, the government often must negotiate
with the other creditors for a solution acceptable to all- or risk conversion to a Chapter 7 case. Conversion often is undesirable because
all creditors, including the government, might receive substantially
less in Chapter 7 than in a Chapter 11 reorganization.
Thus, the differing treatment of debtors in Chapters 7 and 11 can
lead the same creditor, such as the government with an environmental
obligation, to take different positions in identical cases. Further, creditors may have to change positions in the same case if the case
converts from a Chapter 11 reorganization to a Chapter 7 liquidation.-

34. The confirmed plan of reorganization replaces the old obligations with the new obligations
contained in the plan. See Bankruptcy Code § 1141(a).
35. The negotiation and bargaining processes that take place in a Chapter 11 proceeding
are often complicated and defy easy categorization. The text intends to point out only a few of
the positions the government might take or want to take in a Chapter 11 case. See, e.g., Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990) (reporting results
of an empirical study of reorganizations of large, publicly held companies).
In one recent case, the plan of reorganization proposed to pay the EPA's claim in full as an
administrative expense. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 123 B.R. 18, 19 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1990). The EPA objected to the confirmation of the plan claiming that the administrative expense claim was about $270,000,000 and could not be paid under any reasonable prospects of reorganization. Id. The court inquired into the amounts the EPA had been awarded in the cases for
civil penalties and concluded that it was unlikely that the ultimate claim would even reach $25
million, an amount which could reasonably be paid by the reorganized debtor. Id. at 18-20.
There may exist a tendency on the part of the bankruptcy courts to favor reorganization where,
as here, the amount of the outstanding claim was speculative, the case was already five years
old and there were few remaining objections to the plan. Id. at 18-20.
36. Other commentators as well as courts have commented on this point. See Ohio v.
Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944
F.2d 977, affd 948 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1991); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Comment,
Kovacs and Toxic Waste in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1199 (1984).
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This situation may aid the development of the law by forcing lawmakers to sharpen their focus in revising the relevant statutes, and offering
courts a wide range of arguments. However, the current situation has

serious drawbacks. First, it fosters uncertainty and unpredictability.
Second, it can cause parties to forum shop - filing their bankruptcies
in jurisdictions that have adopted the desired view on a particular
question. Therefore, courts must adopt a consistent and coherent approach to characterizing an environmental clean up obligation as a

claim or non-claim.
The timing of the claim is also vital. Only those creditors whose
claims arose pre-petition may share in a Chapter 7 or 11 distribution
or vote on a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Two paths of analysis

lead to this conclusion. First, only a "creditor" may file a 'Proof of
Claim," which may then be "allowed" by the Bankruptcy Court.

7

A

"creditor" is an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose
at the time of or before the order for relief. . . ."s The "order for
relief" in a voluntary bankruptcy case occurs when the debtor files

the petition.3 9 Thus, in a voluntary case, a "creditor" is one who holds
a "claim" that arose at or before the time the bankruptcy petition was
filed.4 0 Second, like the existence of a claim, the amount of a claim is
41
determined or "allowed" as of the date of the filing of the petition.

Under the Code, only those with "allowed claims" share in a Chapter
7 distribution2 or may vote on a Chapter 11 plan.

3

37. Bankruptcy Code § 501(a) provides "A creditor or an indenture trustee may file a proof
of claim." If there is no objection to the proof of claim, the claim is "allowed." Id. § 502(a). If
there is an objection to the proof of claim, the court must determine the amount of the claim.
Id. § 502(b). This "allowed claim" entitles the creditor to participate in any distribution and
determines the weight of the creditor's vote in a Chapter 11 proceeding. See id. § 101(4).
38. Id. § 101(9)(A).
39. Id. § 301. In an involuntary case, the order for relief is filed after the time for contesting
the petition expires, or after the court holds a trial and determines that the involuntary petition
was appropriate. Id. § 303(h).
40. In an involuntary case, the "order for relief" is entered by the court either (1) after
the time has passed in which the debtor may seek to have the case dismissed or (2) if the debtor
seeks to have the case dismissed, after the matter is heard by the court and the court finds
either that (a) the debtor is not paying its debts as they become due or (b) in the 120 days
preceding the bankruptcy a "custodian" was appointed as an assignee for the benefit of creditors.
Id. § 303(h).
41. Id. § 502(b).
42. Id. § 726(a)(2)-(4). This leaves aside the question of administrative expenses, which are
paid first, id. §§ 507(a)(1), 726(a)(1), and which arise after the filing of the petition. See infra
notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
43. Bankruptcy Code § 1126(a).
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Timing issues have consequences similar to the definitional ques-

tion. That is, the time at which a claim "arose" can be an advantage
or a disadvantage depending on the type of debtor and the type of
proceeding involved. The government will share in any distribution

only if the cleanup obligation claim arose pre-petition," or is a post-petition administrative expense. 45 A claim will not be discharged in a
Chapter 7 proceeding unless it arose pre-petition. 46 In a Chapter 11
reorganization proceeding, only those claims that arose pre-confirmation will be discharged.47 Thus, in some cases, the government might

44. See, e.g., id. §§ 726(a)(2), 501, 502(b), 101(10)(A). As noted earlier, a corporation in a
Chapter 7 proceeding does not receive a discharge, but generally it effectively ceases to exist.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Therefore, the government will not share in any
distribution unless the obligation arises pre-petition. See Bankruptcy Code § 726(a)(2)(A).
45. See infra note 54.
46. Bankruptcy Code § 727(b).
47. Id. § 1141(d)(1). The problems presented by the difference in the discharge provisions
in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 present a separate set of questions that are not answered here.
In a Chapter 7 proceeding, all debts that arise pre-petition are discharged. Id. § 727(b). In a
Chapter 11 proceeding, all claims that arise pre-confirmation are discharged. Id. § 1141(d)(1).
This difference creates both theoretical and practical difficulties. Assume that the debtor files
a Chapter 7 proceeding on March 1, and on March 2 the debtor drives through a red light and
injures a pedestrian. As argued later pedestrian has a "claim," but because pedestrian is not a
"creditor," she cannot file a "Proof of Claim." Id. §§ 101(5), (10), 501(a); see infra text accompanying notes 105-06. Further, her claim cannot be allowed as of the date of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
Code § 502(b). The debt arising from this claim is not dischargeable since it arose "post-petition."
Id. § 727(b).
Assume the same series of events except that the debtor filed a Chapter 11 but let us
continue to assume, for the moment, that the debtor is an individual. As in the preceding case,
the pedestrian is not a "creditor" and cannot file a proof of claim or have a claim allowed. Id.
§§ 101(10), 501(a), 502(a). Yet, the claim will presumably be discharged since it arose pre-confirmation. Id. § 1141(a)(1)(A). There is a gap here and the question is how does the Chapter
11 system resolve this? This question is left unanswered here but two suggestions are offered.
First, those with "claims" may vote on the plan and those with "claims" participate in the
Chapter 11 process and distribution. Id. § 1126(a); supra note 25 and accompanying text. Therefore, the pedestrian will at least have a say in the treatment of her claim. Second, depending
on the case, a claim that arises in this "gap" period may be an administrative expense (This is
easier to imagine in a corporate case than in the Chapter 7 individual case.). Bankruptcy Code
§ 503(b)(1)(A); see infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. Other problems are raised, however.
The longer the case remains open, the more claims will be discharged. Since individuals can
use Chapter 11, damages resulting from post-petition acts may well be discharged acts which
may not qualify as administrative expenses. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 503(b)(1)(A), 1141(a)(1)(A).
This raises further problems since it provides incentives to choose Chapter 11 over Chapter 7,
especially in the case of the individual debtor. These issues become further complicated in the
environmental context in which a claim may be a continuing harm, arising every day. An in-depth
look at the problem presented by the difference in the discharge provided by Chapters 7 and
11 is left for another day.
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argue that the debtor's cleanup obligation arose post-petition or postconfirmation. Because this would preclude discharge of the obligation,
it would allow the government to pursue the obligation post-bankruptcy. The government could reach the individual debtor's post-petition
earnings or the reorganized corporate debtor without being limited
by the terms of the plan of reorganization.4
Thus, similar consequences follow both the definitional question of
whether the government has a "claim," and the timing question of
when the claim arose. They both determine whether a claimant can
participate in the bankruptcy proceeding or can pursue the debtor

post-petition. The two questions should not be confused, however,
because the answer to each rests on separate statutory provisions and

requires a separate inquiry. 49 Nevertheless, courts and lawyers often.
confuse the two issues. 0 Although the two questions must be considered separately, it may not be necessary to consider both in every
case. For example, if an obligation is not a claim, then it is not a

"debt" and is not discharged irrespective of when it arose. 51 Thus, if
the obligation is not a "claim," the timing question is irrelevant. The
timing question is determinative only when the obligation is a claim. 52
2.

The Priority of the Environmental Obligation

The definitional question of whether a particular obligation is a

"claim," and the timing question of when the obligation arose, determine the government's ability to recover. In addition, two other factors

may affect the government's ability to recover and the priority of the
environmental obligation. First, a particular obligation may be an "ad-

ministrative expense," entitled to priority over unsecured creditors in

For simplicity the dividing line for dischargeablity of debts will be referred to hereafter as
the date of the petition rather than the date of confmnation in a Chapter 11 case. If the debtor
liquidates under Chapter 11, the debts are again discharged under Chapter 7 and thus a corporation, for example, would not be discharged. Id. § 1141(d)(3). However, in a Chapter 13
proceeding, claims that are provided for in the plan are discharged. Id. § 1328(a)(1).
48. This argument has been considered by several courts. See infra text accompanying
notes 240-60. The question of when a claim arose has been considered in other contexts as well;
most notably in the mass tort context. See infra text accompanying notes 208-16.
49. The claim question is goverened by Bankruptcy Code §§ 101(10), 501. The timing
question is goverened by id. § 503 for administrative expenses, by id. § 726 for a Chapter 7
proceeding, id. § 1141 for a Chapter 11 proceeding, and generally by § 101(10)(A) (regarding
the definition of creditor as one with a claim that arose before the order for relief) and § 502(b)
(regarding "allowing" claims as of the date of the petition).
50. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 174-75.
51. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 727(b), 1141(d)(1)(A).
52. See id. § 501.
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a bankruptcy proceeding. This topic has been discussed at length
elsewhere and will be considered here only in the notes.5

53. Id. § 507(a)(1)-(7) sets forth a list of claims and expenses that are entitled to priority
over general unsecured claims. Administrative expenses are listed in id. § 507(a)(1), and defined
in id. § 503(b).
54. See, e.g., Daniel Klerrnan, Earth First? CERCLA Reimbursement Claims and Bankruptcy, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1991); Lynn Tadlock Manolopoulous, Note, A Congressional
Choice: The Question of Environmental Priority in Bankrupt Estates, 9 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 73 (1990); James N. Lawlor, Comment, Toxic Tug-of-War: Environmental Cleanup
Costs, Bankruptcy and the Administrative Expense Priority - Is It a Collision of Conflicting
Policies or Just Plain Confusion?, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 832 (1991); Richard M. Meth,
Environmental Cleanup Costs as Pre-Petition Claims: An Unintended "Benefit" to Secured
Creditors UnderBankruptcy Code Section 506(c)? (American Bar Association Program: "Dealing
with a Moving Target: The Impact of Environmental Law on Lenders and Bankruptcy Estates"
presented at the ABA 1991 Annual Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia) (copy on file with author).
The question of whether a particular environmental obligation should be entitled to administrative priority is another component in the topic of environmental obligations in bankruptcy.
Because this subject has been treated at length elsewhere, only a few points are mentioned here.
The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the order in which unsecured obligations are to be paid.
Bankruptcy Code § 507(a). The obligations generally given first priority are "administrative
expenses," payable before all other unsecured claims. Id. § 507(a)(1) (In limited cases a "superpriority" may have priority over these expenses. See id. § 507(b).).
An "administrative expense" is the "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate." Id. § 503(b)(1)(A). In some cases the cleanup of a contaminated site may fit this definition
and several courts have permitted cleanup costs to be considered administrative expenses. An
administrative expense can only include expenses that were incurred after the bankruptcy
petition was filed. Bankruptcy Code § 503(b)(1)(A) defines administrative expenses as those
necessary to preserve "the estate." The estate refers to the estate which is created under §
541(a) when the bankruptcy petition is filed. Since no estate exists prior to the filing of the
petition and no costs or expenses spent prior to the filing could have been spent to preserve
the estate, only post-petition expenses can qualify. Therefore, the question of when an obligation
"arose" is important not only for determining whether a government or other person has a claim
against the debtor but also whether that obligation might be an administrative expense.
Many cases have addressed this question and have reached different conclusions. Cases
addressing the administrative priority issue include: In re Chateaugay Corp., 922 F.2d 997,
qftfd 948 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988); In
re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987); Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze
Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, Inc., 125 B.R. 493
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991); In re Synfax Mfg., Inc., 126 B.R. 30 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1990): In re
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 123 B.R. 18 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In re Diamond Reo
Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R. 559 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990); In re F.A. Potts & Co., 114 B.R. 92
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990), affd 922 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 108
B.R. 378 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989), affd 126 B.R. 650 (D. Mass. 1991); In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R.
49 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989); In re Vernon Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 B.R. 580 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1988); In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 73 B.R. 494 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987): In re Peerless
Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Me.
1987); In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Pierce Coal
& Constr., Inc., 65 B.R. 521 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986).
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Second, a claim for a toxic waste site cleanup may be considered
a "secured claim," within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 5 State
and federal governments can enact statutes granting to themselves
liens on some or all of the debtor's property subject only to very
limited constitutional constraints.- Once the lien is in place it will be
respected in bankruptcy. Thus, the state and federal governments
need not be at the mercy of the bankruptcy system regarding priority
of payment. Only a few states have granted to themselves a lien to
secure cleanup obligations.5 7 CERCLA provides for a limited priority

The differences in result in the cases are due both to differences in facts and to the particular
approaches the courts take with respect to the duties of the trustee or the debtor-in-possession.
These different facts and factors include the following:
1. whether the contamination occurred pre-petition or post-petition;
2. whether the cleanup or environmental expense was incurred pre-petition or post-petition;
3. the type of bankruptcy proceeding involved, i.e., whether the case is a Chapter 7 case
(and if so, whether the trustee is authorized to operate the business under § 721) or a Chapter
11 case (and if so, whether it is a Chapter 11 liquidation or a true reorganization);
4. whether 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) applies to the case. This section requires a trustee or a
debtor-in-possession in a bankruptcy case to "manage and operate the property in his possession
. . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the state in which the property is
situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in
possession thereof.";
5. whether the debtor or the subsequent debtor-in-possession or trustee is the owner of
the property;
6. whether the debtor or the subsequent debtor-in-possession or trustee must cleanup or
meet some other environmental obligation in order to obtain a permit necessary to continue
operations; and
7. whether the debtor would be prohibited from abandoning the site in question.
The cases have not reached any consensus on the issue of administrative priority, but the
commentators referred to above have offered insights into this often confusing area. See Klerman,
supra; Meth, supra.
55. Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) defines secured claim as one that is "secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest .... " A "lien" is a "charge against or interest
in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Id. § 101(37).
56. See Kathryn R. Heidt, Cleaning Up Your Act: Efficiency Considerationsin the Battle
for the Debtor'sAssets in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies,40 RUTGERS L. REv. 819, 854-59 (1988).
57. Less than a dozen states have granted to themselves a lien to secure cleanup costs.
Several states provide that the lien is superior to other liens or mortgages on the contaminated
property. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(f) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b(III)(a) & (b) (1990). Some statutes provide that the lien is subject to
liens that were recorded earlier. See, e.g., MICH. ComP. L. ANN., MCL 299.16a(1) (1990); N.Y.
NAVIGATION LAW §§ 181(2)(a)-(e). (McKinney 1991) (regarding petroleum discharges). A few
states have granted to themselves a superior right in all of the debtors assets - not only the
contaminated land - to secure the cost of cleanup. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1lf(f)
(West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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lien on any real estate that has been cleaned up.- Several commentators have considered whether the government should have some
59
type of "superlien," that is, a lien that is superior to preexisting liens.
III.

DEFINITIONS AND TIMING: CLEANUP OBLIGATIONS

The treatment of an obligation in a bankruptcy proceeding ultimately depends on two issues: (1) the definitional issue of whether a
particular environmental obligation is a "claim" within the meaning of
the Bankruptcy Code and (2) the timing issue of when that obligation
arose. 60 These two seemingly basic questions are not resolved easily
because there are different sorts of environmental obligations. This
section will analyze these definitional and timing issues.
There are three sorts of potential environmental obligations: an
obligation to pay money, an obligation to perform a cleanup, and an
obligation to refrain from polluting in the future. The following three
examples of common situations should help to distinguish these sorts
of obligations from each other.
1. The debtor, either an individual or a corporation, is responsible
for cleaning up a toxic waste site. The government performed the
cleanup and billed the debtor for the expense. The debtor then filed
a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 proceeding.61
58. CERCLA § 9607(1)(3). This lien is subject to existing perfected liens, and, therefore,
it provides the government with limited protection.
59. See Heidt, supra note 56; Roger D. Schwenke & Laurel E. Lockett, Superlien "Solutions" to Hazardous Waste: Bankruptcy Conflicts, ENVTL. L. (ABA) (Winter 1983/84); Michael
D. Zarin, State Recovery of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs and Bankruptcy: The Constitutionality of Retroactive State Super-Priority Lien Statutes, 90 COM. L.J. 346 (1985); Lawlor, Comment, supra note 54.
Even in the absence of a "superlien," a government or other person who cleaned up a
contaminated site may also be able to recoup some of its costs from any secured creditor that
was benefitted by such cleanup. Section 506(c) allows the trustee to recover certain expenses
of preserving or disposing of secured property to the extent the secured party was benefitted.
These expenses may be recovered from the secured property itself. Section 506(c) provides:
"The Trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any
benefit to the holder of such claim." For a more detailed discussion of this issue and a review
of the relevant cases, see Meth. supra note 54.
60. Professor Baird and Dean Jackson offer a global approach to this subject. Baird &
Jackson, supra note 36, at 1199. While Baird and Jackson's treatment of the Kovacs case is
very insightful, it is helpful to begin with a close focus on the statute itself. Further, in light

of the additional issues that courts have had to resolve after Kovacs was decided, a full explanation of the statutory framework is necessary. For a further discussion of Baird and Jackson's
Comment, see infra text accompanying notes 102-10.
61. The United States Supreme Court has recently held that an individual debtor may file
a Chapter 11 proceeding. Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991). Since the individual will
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2a. The debtor, either an individual or a corporation, was ordered
to clean up a site. Instead of cleaning up the site, the debtor filed a
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 proceeding. The applicable environmental
law provides an alternative remedy of payment to the government
instead of cleanup.
2b. Same as #2a above, but the applicable environmental law does
not expressly allow the payment of money to be substituted for the
actual cleanup.
3. In any of the above situations, an injunction was issued before
the bankruptcy filing, prohibiting the debtor from polluting in the
future.62
A.

Definitions: Is the Obligation a "Claim?"

The Bankruptcy Code defines "claim" as follows:
"claim" means (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether
or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, un'
disputed, secured, or unsecured.
Subsection (A) includes rights that are legal in nature, meaning those
which are for money damages. Subsection (B) includes equitable rem-

receive a discharge under essentially the same terms as she would in a Chapter 7, see Bankruptcy
Code § 1141(d)(3), the individual Chapter 11 case should have the same outcome as a Chapter
7 case.
62. Another situation might also be considered: X Corporation is responsible for the cleanup
of a site contaminated with toxic waste. The government cleans up the site and requests payment
from X Corporation. X Corporation files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Assume the applicable law
requires X Corporation to reimburse the government in order to obtain a permit to continue
operations. This situation raises questions about the applicability of Bankruptcy Code §§ 524(a)(2),
525(a). It raises questions about the relationship of the 'lien pass-through" doctrine to these
sections. Liens pass through bankruptcy even though the debt which they secure has been
discharged. See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886). A full development of these issues is
beyond the scope of this article since this type of environmental control has not been widely
used in the toxic waste context. Nevertheless, the requirement of a license or permit should
be explored along with other options (such as enacting liens on approprjate property) to enhance
the possibility of government recovery for certain environmental transgressions.
63. Bankruptcy Code § 101(5).
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edies if the breach of the obligation that gave rise to the equitable
remedy also gives rise to a right to payment. Thus, if money may be
substituted for the performance of the equitable obligation the obligation is a "claim" under section 101(5)(B).
An earlier draft of the Bankruptcy Code expressly included even
purely equitable rights within the definition of "claim." The earlier
version provided that a "claim" included the "right to an equitable
remedy for breach of performance if such breach does not give rise
to a right to payment."- Equitable obligations that did not have a
money substitute would have been "claims" under this earlier version.
This definition was revised in the final draft of the statute to exclude
purely equitable remedies, limiting the definition of "claim" to those
equitable remedies for which money could be substituted.- Congress
expressly intended to exclude from the definition of "claim" obligations
that were purely equitable in nature. As an example, Congress expressly noted the right to specific performance. If the applicable law
allowed money damages to be substituted for the remedy of specific
performance, then the underlying obligation was a "claim. '" Conversely, if the applicable state law did not permit the substitution of
money damages for the equitable remedy, the obligation was not a
"claim." Still, the current definition of "claim" is very broad. Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court has found that Congress intended
67
the definition to be broad.

64.
65.

H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) (emphasis added).
The House and Senate Reports state:
This is intended to cause the liquidation or estimation of contingent rights of
payment for which there may be an alternate equitable remedy with the result
that the equitable remedy will be susceptible to being discharged in bankruptcy.
For example, in some States, a judgment for specific performance may be satisfied
by an alternative right to payment, in the event performance is refused; in that
event the creditor entitled to specific performance would have a "claim" for purposes
of a proceeding under title 11.
On the other hand, rights to an equitable remedy for a breach of performance
with respect to which such breach does not give rise to a right to payment are
not "claims" and would therefore not be susceptible to discharge in bankruptcy.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977); S.R. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
21 (1978).
66. See supra note 65. Further, whether a particular right was purely equitable or had an
alternate money substitute, could vary from state to state and depended on the non-bankruptcy
laws involved. This is evident from Congress's statement that the right to specific performance
could be satisfied by money "in some States" and would thus be a claim in those states. See
supra note 65 for the text of this legislative comment.
67. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990). Davenport
dealt with subsection (A) of Bankruptcy Code § 105. In Davenport, the debtors had been ordered
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Examples 1 and 3, above illustrate the claim definition's limits in
the environmental context. In example 1, the government cleaned up
a site and sought reimbursement from the debtor before the debtor
filed bankruptcy. The debtor's only remaining obligation was to reimburse the government. That obligation to pay money is a "right to
payment." Therefore, it is within the section 101(5)(A) definition of
"claim." Further, the government is a "creditor" and can file a proof
of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. 68
In contrast to the payment obligation of example 1, example 3
involved an injunction prohibiting the debtor from polluting in the
future. For instance, a debtor who has been ordered to stop releasing
chemical waste into a river must comply with that order if it continues
to operate its business in bankruptcy. 69 Such an order generally will
be non-dischargeable since the obligation is not a "claim." This order
is not a "right to payment" within section 101(5)(A). Nor is the order
within section 101(5)(B). If the debtor continues to pollute, the government may be entitled to an injunction prohibiting the debtor from
polluting. This injunction would be an equitable remedy for the breach
70
of the environmental laws.

to make restitution payments as a result of a criminal conviction. Id. at 2129. The debtors later
filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Unlike Chapter 7, Chapter 13 does not except such an
obligation from discharge. The Court said Congress intended the meaning of "debt" and "claim"
to be "co-extensive." Id. at 2130; see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 65, at 310; S.R. REP.
No. 989, supra note 65, at 23. The Court said Congress intended to give a broad meaning to
the term "claim" so that it would include all legal obligations of the debtor. Davenport, 110 S.
Ct. at 2130; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 65, at 309; S.R. REP. No. 989, supra note 65, at
22. Based on the plain meaning of the phrase "right to payment," the restitution obligation was
a "claim" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2131. The
obligation was, therefore, a "debt" and was dischargeable under Chapter 13. Id.
In an earlier decision, Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986), the Court held that a criminal
restitution order was an exception to a discharge in a Chapter 7 case pursuant to Bankruptcy
Code § 523(a)(7). Since the restitution obligation was within an exception to discharge specifically
set out in the Code, the Court did not reach the question of whether a restitution order is a
"debt" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2130-31.
68. Thus, the government will share with the other creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding.
In the case of an individual debtor, the debtor will be discharged. Bankruptcy Code § 727(b).
In the case of a Chapter 11 proceeding the claim will be provided for in the plan and the debtor
will be discharged. See supra text accompanying notes 25-43 for a detailed discussion of these
results.
69. The trustee or debtor-in-possession will automatically be entitled to operate the business
in the case of a Chapter 11 proceeding. Bankruptcy Code § 1108. The trustee can be permitted
to operate the business in a Chapter 7 proceeding if the operation is in the best interest of the
estate. Id. § 721.
70. The United States Supreme Court has held that the language of Bankruptcy Code §
101(5)(B) includes situations based on statutes, not only those based on contracts. Ohio v.
Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); see infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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On its face, this breach does not give rise to a "right to payment."
If the flow of chemical waste continues, money damages in the future
might compensate for additional harm. Generally, however, money
cannot be awarded for an anticipated violation of a statute or injunction
prohibiting pollution.71 Although the government might be entitled to
damages in the future if the debtor actually does continue to pollute,
this does not constitute an alternative right to payment like that
mentioned in the legislative history to section 101(5)(B). 72 Since the
government cannot substitute money for the injunction before the
injunction is violated, the order to stop polluting is not a "claim." It
is, therefore, not a "debt" and is not dischargeable.7
Examples 2a and 2b from the beginning of this section represent
the more difficult case of an order requiring the debtor itself to clean
up a contaminated site. The order is not on its face a "right to payment"
within section 101(5)(A). A cleanup order often takes the form of an
injunction, or is reduced to an injunction when the debtor fails to
comply with the order.-4 Therefore, if such an order is within the
definition of a "claim," it must fit within the section 101(5)(B) definition
of "claim." That is, the order or injunction must be a "right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise
to a right to payment." 7' 5
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this "breach of
performance" language of section 101(5)(B) to include a breach or
violation of a statute. 76 The breach need not be of a commercial or
other type of consensual obligation. 77 Thus, the key question is: under

71. Although in theory a dollar amount could be placed on the prospective failure to comply,
as a practical matter our legal system does not award money in advance for the expected future
violation. While a system of fines or permits to pollute could be adopted, they are not the rule
in CERCLA. Further, it would be difficult to assess damages prospectively due both to the
costs of assessing future damages and the uncertainty involved. While we can ultimately place
a dollar value on past injuries we do not know the costs of pollution that will happen tomorrow.
72. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
73. This result also is consistent with the fact that the debtor should not be given a
competitive advantage just because it is in bankruptcy. A debtor has no "license to pollute"
just because is is in bankruptcy. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES.
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 769-70 (2d ed. 1990).
74. See, e.g., Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 279 (discussed infra text accompanying notes 85-97);
United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988) (discussed infra text accompanying
notes 130-51); United States v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160, 163 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (discussed infra text
accompanying notes 163-72), affd 928 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1991).
75. See supra note 63.
76. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 279.
77. Id. at 275; see infra text accompanying notes 85-97.
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what circumstances does an equitable remedy for breach of performance give rise to a right to payment within the section 101(5)(B)
definition of "claim?"
Some environmental statutes expressly provide alternatives. For
example, the government can order a person to clean up a site, or
can perform the cleanup itself and then seek reimbursement from the
debtor. This alternative right to payment makes the cleanup obligation
a "claim" within section 101(5)(B).78 Because CERCLA grants the
government just this sort of alternative right, 79 a cleanup order issued
pursuant to CERCLA is a "claim."
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently has held
some such orders to be "claims" but refused to rule categorically that
all cleanup orders under CERCLA are "claims." The court in In re
Chateaugay CorpY° remarked on the dual nature of most cleanup
orders by noting that an order to clean up often may be viewed as
directed toward eliminating continuing pollution, which results from
past acts. 81 The court noted that money damages may be substituted
for a cleanup order directed at past pollution, but not for a similar
order directed at alleviating future pollution. 2 In other words, the
government cannot accept or substitute money as compensation for
the continuing pollution.m Despite this insight, the court's analysis
tends to confuse the issue of the definition of a "claim" with the
question of the timing of the claim.Y

78. The situation can be technically more complicated depending on the statutes involved.
Since the statutes vary from one to another and from state to state, it is difficult to be precise.
Some statutes that require cleanup are often not the same as those that prohibit disposal. For
example, RCRA generally regulates disposal while CERCLA controls cleanup of existing sites.
Although RCRA has been expanded recently, CITE, and now includes more comprehensive
cleanup requirements, RCRA generally regulates while CERCLA controls cleanup of existing
sites. Thus, a cleanup order may be issued solely because a person owns or operates a contaminated site. Technically, no "breach of performance" is needed to give rise to the cleanup order.
However, once a person is ordered to clean up, if the order is not complied with the government
can pursue the debtor and obtain an injunction forcing cleanup. Thus, the very failure to clean
up itself can be viewed as the breach which may or may not eventually give rise to a right to
payment, depending on the statute. Further, some statutes both prohibit disposal and require
cleanup when there is a breach of the prohibition against disposal.
79. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
80. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). This case is discussed in detail infra text accompanying
notes 152-78 & 217-19.
81. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1007.
82. Id. at 1008.
83. Id.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 104-10.
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The single Supreme Court case on this issue of the treatment of
a cleanup order in a bankruptcy proceeding is Ohio v. Kovacs. In
Kovacs, the state environmental statute did not contain an alternative
right to payment.8 6 However, the Court held that the State of Ohio
had a "claim" because it had acted pursuant to other state laws that
effectively gave the state control of the debtor's assets. 87 The State
of Ohio had ordered Mr. Kovacs to clean up a site contaminated by
him and the corporation he owned and operated.8 When Kovacs failed
to comply, Ohio pursued a remedy under a general state statute allowing a court to appoint a receiver to carry out a judgment s9 The appointed receiver took control of Kovacs' assets and dispossessed
Kovacs, thus making him unable to clean up the site himself. Therefore, the Court held that the order effectively had been transformed
into a right to payment.- However, the Court carefully disclaimed
any decisions regarding what the result would have been had the
receiver not actually been appointed.9'
Although the Kovacs Court limited its holding to the facts,9 the
decision raises further questions. Consider a statute that provides a
mechanism to enforce an equitable order, which gives the state control
of the debtor's assets. Would this mechanism transform the equitable
right into a "right to payment"? Because many states have such enforcement mechanisms for equitable remedies, many otherwise purely
equitable remedies ultimately might be deemed "claims" within the
93
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
Whether these obligations constitute "rights to payment" will depend on the enforcement statute involved. The Supreme Court in
Kovacs did not examine the statute in question, nor have commentators analyzed the specific rights given to a governmental claimant
by state enforcement statutes. Nevertheless, these statutes will determine whether a government ultimately has a "right" to payment or
not.
Parties must consult the appropriate state or federal statute in
each case. Here, the Ohio statute is examined since it was the statute
involved in Kovacs. The Ohio statute provides:
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
issuing

Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 274.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 276.
Id.; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2735.01(c) (1991); see infra text accompanying note 94.
Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276-77.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Alternatively, the enforcement of a judgment may remain in the hands of the court
the order.
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A receiver may be appointed by the supreme court or a
judge thereof, the court of appeals or a judge thereof in his
district, the court of common pleas or a judge thereof in his
county . . . in causes pending in such courts respectively,
in the following cases:
"C)
( After judgment, to carry the judgment into effect;
( In all other cases in which receivers have been ap(F)
pointed by the usages of equity. 94
Under this statute, the appointment of a receiver is a matter for
the court's discretion.9 5 There is no absolute right to transform an
injunction into a right to take the debtor's assets. Rather, a claimant
entitled to equitable relief must request the court to exercise its discretion to appoint a receiver. Only then will the government obtain
a "right" to the debtor's assets.
In Kovacs, the right to pursue the debtor's assets rested within
the sound discretion of the courts. The State of Ohio actually used
the available state statutes to pursue the debtor's assets. The obligation achieved "claim" status only after the state's inchoate "rights"
were "actualized" as a result of court action. Further, the state had
sought discovery from the debtor regarding his income and the state
had admitted that it would have been satisfied with money.9 If we
read Kovacs as limited to these facts, the mere existence of a state
law mechanism9 to enforce an equitable remedy should not be sufficient to transform the obligation into a claim. Rather, the state actually
must pursue that alternative, and the court must grant the remedy.
In other words, inchoate "rights" must become "actualized" before
"claim" status attaches. This conclusion is consistent with congressional
intent to exclude purely equitable remedies from the Bankruptcy Code
definition of "claim."
In summary, if the environmental statute that requires cleanup
creates an alternate right to payment, then the obligation is a "claim"

94.

OHIo. REV. CODE ANN. § 2735.01 (1991) (emphasis added).

95. State v. Gibbs, 573 N.E.2d 62, 66 (1991) (and cases cited therein).
96. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276-77.
97. That is, the alternative right to pursue the debtor need not be in the environmental
statute that is the subject of the action. The ability to pursue the debtor's assets under state
law generally is sufficient.
98. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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because it fits squarely within the definition of section 101(5)(B).9
However, if the statute does not create such an alternate right to
payment, the obligation nevertheless will be a "claim" if (1) a general
mechanism allows the government to pursue the debtor's assets in a
way which dispossesses the debtor and renders the debtor unable to
perform the cleanup personally and (2) the government actually attempts to use that mechanism and (3) the court actually grants the
government the requested relief. As in Kovacs, the obligation is a
"claim" if the government actually dispossesses the debtor, the debtor
can no longer perform the cleanup, and the only way for the debtor
to satisfy the obligation is to pay money.
Professor Baird and Dean Jackson have considered the question
of "claim," generally and in the context of environmental claims. They
define "claim" generally as the claimant's ability to pursue the debtor's
assets (but for the bankruptcy) to satisfy the obligation. °- In effect,
the Supreme Court has taken this approach. Recently, the Court held
that a creditor had a "claim" when it had only the ability to pursue
a single asset, the debtor's farm, but did not have the right to pursue
the debtor personally, or debtor's assets generally. 101
Professor Baird and Dean Jackson have analyzed environmental
obligations more specifically from a timing perspective, distinguishing
between past and future claims. They divide environmental claims
into two classes: those based on past acts, and those prohibiting certain
future acts.102 An obligation based on the debtor's past acts is a "claim."
However, an obligation to abide by regulatory laws in the future (such
as the prohibition against polluting a river) is not a "claim." Thus, in
the examples given earlier, all of the cleanup orders would be "claims."
Only the last example,' enjoining the future pollution of a river, would

99. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66 & 78-80. But see infra text accompanying
notes 164-80.
100. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 34-35; BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 73, at 132.
101. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991). This case possibly limits In re
Villarie, 648 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1981) in which the court held that the debtor's obligation to
repay a loan to his retirement agency was not a "claim." Id. at 812. The retirement system did
not have the right to sue the debtor to repay the loan or to pursue the debtor's assets generally.
Id. It did have the right to deduct payments from the debtor's wages if the debtor continued
with the same employer. Id. This ability to seek only a portion of the wages from a single
employee and not to be able to pursue the debtor's assets generally lead the court to conclude
that the obligation was not a "claim." Id. Even under the Second Circuit's narrow interpretation
of "claim" the state that grants itself the right to pursue the assets of the debtor generally
runs the risk of transforming the debtor's obligation into a claim.
102. Baird & Jackson, supranote 36, at 1204-05; BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 73, at 771.
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not be a "claim." In fact, Baird and Jackson assert that this distinction
is precisely what Congress meant to capture in the definition of

"claim. 2113
There is an instant appeal to classifying all environmental obliga-

tions as either purely in the past or future to distinguish "claims"
from nonclaims. Obligations based on pre-petition acts are "claims,"
while obligations of a continuing regulatory nature that apply in the
future are not. The classification relates to the technical statutory

language: obligations that prohibit future acts do not create present
"rights to payment" for future breaches and, therefore, are not claims.
The distinction between past and future acts is good and useful as

far as it goes. However, the "past versus future" analysis tends to
confuse the definitional issue with the timing issue. 0 The definition
of "claim" is independent of time. An obligation can be technically
within the definition of "claim" even if it arises after the bankruptcy

103. Baird & Jackson, supra note 36, at 1204.
104. There are two other difficulties that appear on the surface but do not pass close
examination. First, by saying that an obligation not to pollute in the future is not a "claim"
and, therefore, not a debt, and not dischargeable, achieves the desired purpose of requiring
debtors to comply with the environmental laws in the future and to therefore require them to
compete equally with their competitors. This result can arguably be reached by simply viewing
the question as one of timing without having to decide that the obligation is or is not a claim.
Since the obligation not to pollute applies post-petition, the obligation arises every day, including
every day post-petition. Thus, even if considered a "claim" it would still not be dischargeable
to the extent it arises post-petition. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Nonetheless,
the Code has both a definitional requirement and a timing requirement. The fact that this
obligation arguably arose post-petition and can be resolved on the timing issue does not mean
we can disregard the "claim" element. This distinction between past and future seen in the
definition of claim may remain helpful in sorting out those obligations that are not claims.
Second, one can argue that the past versus future harm theory diminishes 28 U.S.C. §
959(b), which requires a debtor to comply with all "valid laws of the State" in which the property
is located while operating the business. Section 959(b) accomplishes much of what Baird and
Jackson argue the definition of claim does (i.e., it requires a debtor to comply with laws and
regulations in the future). One can argue that the definition of "claim" should not be read to
be redundant and must have an independent meaning. However, the two sections are not
identical. Section 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) on its face applies only to state laws. There is some question
as to whether it applies to federal law and whether it applies in liquidation cases when the
debtor is not operating the business. See, e.g., In re Borne Chem. Co., 54 B.R. 126 (Bankr.
D. N.J. 1984) (holding 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) only applies when property is being managed for
continuing operations, not liquidation).
Further, one provision is part of Title 11, the Bankruptcy Code, while the other is part of
Title 28, the United States Judicial Code. Finally, if the debtor has been ordered to take some
action or refrain from doing certain acts the question of the meaning of that order (is it a claim?)
and the timing of the obligation (when did it arise?) are relevant and separate questions from
the obligation to comply with all valid state laws as the debtor continues to operate.
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proceeding was filed. For example, assume that the debtor files a
bankruptcy proceeding on March 1, 1990. On the next day, March 2,
1990, the debtor drives through a red light and injures pedestrian.
Pedestrian has a "claim"; she has a right to payment even though it
may be disputed. She has the right to sue the debtor and to pursue
his assets if she wins. However, she cannot participate in the bankruptcy process since her claim arose after the petition was filed. She
1 Further, if
is not a "creditor 105 and cannot file a "proof of claim." ""
the court were asked to "allow" her claim under section 502(b), the
amount of the claim would be zero, because there was no claim on
the date of the petition. 017 Finally, the "debt" owed to her would not
be discharged because it did not "arise" pre-petition.10
Although conceptually interesting, the analysis of Baird and
Jackson does not track the statute closely enough. Congress eliminated
all purely equitable relief from the definition of "claim." There are
forms of purely equitable relief other than prohibitions against future
acts, such as a decree of specific performance, that have no alternative
right to payment. 0 9 Professor Baird and Dean Jackson argue persuasively that the right to specific performance also should not be a
"claim."' ' 0 While Baird and Jackson argue persuasively for including
some equitable obligations within the definition of "claim," this is not
the definition contained in the current statute."' However, Congress
should consider their approach when it next reconsiders bankruptcy
law.
Even if we accept the past versus future distinction, it fails to
classify adequately all environmental obligations. While the analysis
identifies the future obligation to refrain from polluting as not a
"claim," it fails to identify all of the obligations that are claims. One
act in the past can have many effects. Some of these effects may
manifest themselves pre-petition, while others may manifest themselves post-petition. For example, those who manufactured asbestos

105. A creditor is one who has a "claim" that arose before the "order for relief," i.e., usually
the petition. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
106. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
108. Bankruptcy Code § 727(b); see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
110. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 64-67; BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 73, at 187-88,
263-64.
111. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the view taken
here. In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). For a discussion of this case, see infra
text accompanying notes 153-77.
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pre-petition caused events not fully realized until decades later. Although the courts generally have avoided deciding whether these future victims had "claims" and when they arose, the courts effectively
have treated them as claims.112 In the typical asbestos case, the acts
that caused the injury occurred pre-petition. Therefore, the resulting
obligations would be "claims" under the Baird and Jackson analysis.
The environmental context is different from asbestos cases, however. The typical asbestos case involves simply pre-petition exposure
to a dangerous substance (a substance since removal), and waiting to
see if a disease manifests itself. In the environmental context, however, the site remains contaminated. Injury can occur post-petition
due to post-petition exposure to the contamination. Thus, in the environmental context, the continued state of contamination includes a
future element."1
There is a close relationship between the questions of whether a
claim exists and when it arose. Yet, the two questions must be considered separately as they are in the Bankruptcy Code.
B.

Timing: When Did the Claim Arise?

The timing issue, like the definitional issue, is easiest to resolve
at the extremes. At one extreme, when the government has already
cleaned up the site and requested payment before the bankruptcy
petition is filed, the claim "arose" pre-petition. This situation is illustrated by example 1 at the beginning of this section. At the other
extreme, since an injunction prohibiting pollution in the future is not
a "claim," we do not reach the timing issue. This is illustrated by
example 3 at the beginning of this section. Further, the obligation not
to pollute arises every day and thus continues to arise post-petition.

112. The courts provided representation for these claimants and enjoined them from bringing
suit against the debtor post-petition for injuries caused or to be caused by the debtor's pre-petition acts. See infra text accompanying notes 211-13.
113. To the extent asbestos continues to exist in a building and can cause future injury,
the situations are similar. Dean Jackson has noted his view that harm based on post-petition
exposure to asbestos is nonetheless a pre-petition claim since the acts giving rise to the injury
occurred pre-petition. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 48, n.52. For the reasons discussed in the
text relating to environmental harms, these obligations are better viewed as arising post-petition.
Yet, Dean Jackson notes that a contaminated site may emit harmful fumes each day giving rise
to a post-petition harm, id. at 176, n.43, a seemingly inconsistent position. Dean Jackson only
addresses these two points incidentally and not in detail, however, in his comprehensive treatment of bankruptcy law generally. His treatment of these points is not and was probably not
intended as complete.
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The difficult question between the extremes concerns property that
was contaminated pre-petition and has not yet been cleaned up post-petition.
This section discusses this more difficult situation. The section
begins by examining the argument advanced by the government in
several cases. The government argues that there can be no liability
until it incurs expenses in cleaning up or investigating the site. This
section then analyzes the timing issue in more depth. The cleanup
obligation may properly be classified as either pre-petition or post-petition. The classification depends on whether the cleanup obligation is
being imposed on (1) the contaminated property's current owner, or
(2) another category of persons such as former owners, "generators,"
or "transporters." Therefore, this section breaks down the timing question between those liable as current owners and those liable in any
capacity.
1. Timing: The Relationship Between Government Expenditure and the
Timing of the Claim
Assume that all of the acts creating the need for cleanup occurred
pre-petition, but the government's action occurred post-petition.
CERCLA allows the government to recover for cleanup and related
activities, such as investigation, only when the government has "incurred" some response costs.1 1 4 Therefore, the government has argued in
several cases that a claim cannot "arise" until the government incurs
some cost in connection with the contaminated site. For example, if
the government incurs an expense post-petition, it has a post-petition
claim.
This argument is rather contrived. The government could manipulate the time a claim "arose" by postponing site cleanup or investigation. If all of the acts giving rise to a need for cleanup occurred

114. CERCLA § 9607(a)(4)(A). Subsection (4)(A) imposes liability for "all costs of removal
or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State .. " Id. (emphasis
added). Thus, the argument goes: if the government has not yet spent any money, it has not
"incurred" any removal or remedial costs and has no right to recovery. Removal action is the cost
of cleanup as well as the cost to "assess or evaluate the release or threatened release" and costs
to prevent or minimize the harm. Id. § 9601(23). "Remedial action" includes other acts to
minimize the danger. Id. § 960L(24). Both removal and remedial acts and costs are referred to
as "response" acts or costs. Id. § 9601(25). Section 9601(4)(C) imposes liability for "damages for
injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
such injury.
...
This section does not require that the costs have been "incurred" by the
government. Thus, in cases in which there has been damage to natural resources the government's argument that the claim cannot "arise" until costs are incurred is weaker still.
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pre-petition, there exists pre-petition a fundamental right to relief.
This right, under a statute such as CERCLA, carries with it an alternative right to payment, even though it is contingent on the government's expending money. Courts considering this question agreed with
this criticism, holding that the incurring of costs is not what triggers

liability and not what fixes the time the claim "arose." 115 In this context
of foundational right, the timing of government expenditures should
not be a factor at all.

This does not mean that all cleanup obligations are pre-petition
obligations. The following two sections discuss when cleanup claims

can be said to "arise" post-petition.
2.

Liability as the Current Owner

Under CERCLA and similar state statutes, the current owner of
contaminated property is liable for cleanup. When the bankruptcy

petition is filed the debtor's property becomes property of the bankruptcy estate. 116 Therefore, during the bankruptcy proceeding, the

115. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 217-19); In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992); In re Jensen,
127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. Cal. 1991) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 240-59).
One case involving a debtor which had been discharged of its obligations could be read to
disagree. United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990). See infra
text accompanying notes 220-35. A case in which the debtor had been discharged before CERCLA
was enacted held that the claim could not exist before CERCLA was enacted. The case is
distinguishable since no CERCLA cause of action could have existed. In re Penn Central Transp.
Co., 944 F.2d. 164 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992); see infra text accompanying
notes 236-39.
116. Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(1). For the view that liability for toxic waste cleanup is in
effect a "servitude" on the contaminated land and a discussion of how such a servitude should
be treated in a variety of factual settings, see David Gray Carlson, Successor Liability in
Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of Intertemporal Creditor PrioritiesCreated by Running
Covenants, Products Liability, and Toxic Waste Clean Up, LAW & CONTEMIP. PROBS., Spring
1987, at 119. Professor Carlson argues that the cost of cleanup should be an administrative
expense when the value of the land when cleaned up is greater than the cost of cleanup. Id.
at 151-53. His argument is as follows: Environmental law requires the landowner to cleanup a
contaminated site. Id. The trustee, as the landowner, is subject to this requirement. Id. To
cleanup a site the trustee must be able to guarantee payment to the contractors who will preform
the work. Id. Thus, an administrative expense for these cleanup expenses is necessary. Id.
Alternatively, the trustee could sell the land but a buyer would discount the purchase price by
the cost of cleanup since the buyer will inherit the cleanup responsibility. Id. Theoretically, the
result would be the same whether the trustee cleans up the site and then sells it or sells it
prior to cleanup. Id. The trustee should therefore not prefer one choice over another. Id.
However, Professor Carlson argues that allowing the buyer to cleanup will "prolong" and 'increase" the harm to the public. "If the trustee or the government could have cleaned up the
land for less than the buyer's perceived costs would be, the price of the land would have been
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bankruptcy estate is responsible for the cleanup because it is the
owner of the property. A new cleanup obligation "arises" post-petition
every day that the property remains contaminated. Designating the
cleanup obligation as post-petition, however, does not determine who
will pay for the cleanup. The answer depends on the type of debtor
and the type of proceeding involved.
In the case of an individual debtor in Chapter 7, the estate, not
the individual debtor, is liable as the current owner of the contaminated
property. Because it is often difficult for the estate to "abandon"
contaminated property, the estate usually cannot simply return the
property with the cleanup liability to the individual debtor by abandoning it. 117 Since the individual debtor's liability as current owner is a
pre-petition obligation which does not arise anew post-petition, it is
generally dischargeable.""
Some post-petition liability might remain on the individual debtor,
however, in its capacity as a former, rather than current, owner. This
liability is discussed in the next section.
If the debtor is a corporation liquidating under Chapter 7, the
answer is similar, even though the corporate debtor does not receive
a discharge. The contaminated property belongs to the bankruptcy
estate and the question becomes one of the trustee's obligation and
of the priority to be given to cleanup activity.
In a Chapter 11 reorganization, different factors are relevant. If
the reorganization is successful, the reorganized corporation will be-

excessively discounted (diminishing the bankrupt estate pro tanto) and the general creditors
would have suffered a corresponding loss." Id. at 152. He concludes that the trustee or the
government should have the choice whether to sell or cleanup with the cleanup costs being a
high priority. Id. That is, if cleanup costs are effectively placed on the estate when the property
is sold to a buyer who discounts for the cost of cleanup, we should just place the cost on the
estate directly as a high priority and allow the trustee to make the choice as to whether to
cleanup and keep the property or sell the property.
117. When and under what circumstances the trustee or debtor-in-possession can abandon
contaminated property has been considered by several courts, including the United States
Supreme Court. The trustee or debtor-in-possession cannot abandon property "in contravention
of' local law. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494
(1986). Some courts have allowed abandonment while others have not. See In re Smith-Douglass,
Inc., 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 B.R. 912 (Bankr. E.D.
Wisc. 1989) (both allowing abandonment when there was no immediate danger to the public
and there were few free assets which could be used to pay for a cleanup); In re FCX, Inc., 96
B.R. 49, 54-55 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1989) (refusing to allow abandonment when there was a
threat of serious harm and there may have been some funds to pay for cleanup).
118. The individual debtor is entitled to a discharge of all pre-petition obligations as part
of the fresh start given individuals. Bankruptcy Code § 727(a)-(b). There are exceptions to this
right of a discharge, id. § 727(a), and to the discharge of certain debts as well. Id. § 523(a).
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come the new owner of the property. As the owner, it will have to
comply with the environmental laws as it continues its business. However, the debtor may argue that a cleanup obligation is a pre-confirmation obligation since it is based on pre-confirmation acts. The debtor
may provide for the claim in the reorganization plan, and assert that
the obligation is therefore discharged. 119 But if the reorganized debtor
needs to retain the contaminated property as part of the reorganization
plan, it nonetheless will be liable as the then-current owner. 120
If the obligation is a claim against the reorganized debtor, the

debtor must be able to meet the obligation in order to have its reorganization plan confirmed. That is, the plan and reorganization must
be "feasible" as required by section 1129(a)(11). If the obligation of
the estate is treated as an administrative expense, as opposed to an

obligation of the reorganized debtor, the plan must provide for full
payment of the claim on the effective date of the plan. 121 An individual
debtor who files a Chapter 11 (or 12 or 13) petition and who owns
contaminated property at the conclusion of the case, likewise will be
liable as the current owner of the property.

119. In Chateaugay, discussed infra text accompanying notes 152-78 and 216-18, it was
just such a proposal that sent the government into court seeking a declaratory judgment that
the various cleanup orders were not claims, were not dischargeable, and were administrative
expenses. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 999-1000.
120. The passing of ownership from pre-bankruptcy debtor to the estate to post-bankruptcy
debtor can result in some interesting problems. During the bankruptcy proceeding the government can assert that the estate is liable for cleanup and can compel cleanup - assuming no
violation of the automatic stay. See Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) & (b)(4)-(5). If the government
fails to act, however, and the property passes to the reorganized debtor, the estate's liability
will end because it is neither the current owner nor was it the owner at the time of the
contamination. CERCLA does not impose liability on the intervening owners. Thus, the government will lose its ability to recover from the estate. The government may find that the reorganized debtor lacks the capability to cleanup, despite predictions made at the time of confirmation. Further, if the government cleans up the property after the reorganization is complete,
the cost is arguably not an "administrative expense" as the case is completed. As a result, the
government must assess the situation quickly whenever a potentially responsible person files a
bankruptcy proceeding.
121. Id. § 1129(a)(9) (unless the claimant agrees to another treatment). Note that whether
the obligation is an obligation of the reorganized debtor or is considered an administrative
expense, the government does not vote on the plan. The plan is not required to "classify"
administrative expenses. Id. § 1123(a)(1). Thus there is no mechanism through which their votes
can be counted (see id. § 1126(c), which explains when a class of claims has accepted or rejected
a plan). Future obligations of the reorganized debtor are not covered by the plan. The idea of
future obligations has troubled the courts and commentators.
The government can, however, object to the plan, should it not propose to pay administrative
claims in full. With respect to the other creditors, either (1) the debtor must reach an agreement
with a sufficient number so that they will vote to accept the plan or (2) the debtor must be
able to cram down the plan pursuant to § 1129(b).
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Courts often have considered the timing problem without recognizing it as such. This has yielded a confusing set of results. For example,
courts may recognize a claim as being pre-petition but then declare
the cleanup to be an administrative expense, that is, an expense necessary to "preserve" the estate.12 However, a pre-petition obligation
cannot be an administrative expense as there was no "estate" to preserve until the petition was filed. These courts need a bridge between
the pre-petition (or pre-confirmation) nature of these claims and the
classification of the obligation as a post-petition administrative expense. Recognizing that liability is imposed by the environmental statutes on owners pendent lite provides that bridge. In sum, since the
obligation arises anew based on the ownership of the property, the
cleanup obligation is itself post-petition.
S. Other Types of Liability
This section discusses the liability of all persons responsible for
cleanup or other corrective action under any environmental statute.
Under the CERCLA scheme, for example, property owners at the
time of contamination, "generators," "transporters," and current owners all may be responsible parties. However, some statutes classify
those responsible differently.
Even if liability is not based directly on one's status as current
owner, the failure to clean up can cause additional post-petition harms,
which properly can be viewed as post-petition obligations. The cost
of avoiding that harm -- cleanup - is arguably a post-petition obligation. Specifically, pre-petition contamination of land and water can
create a problem having both pre- and post-petition consequences.
When toxic materials are released, some exposures and injuries may
occur immediately, while others occur later. Over time the contamination may expand to pollute uncontaminated neighboring property. New
injuries will develop from these newly contaminated areas. The initial
contamination sets in motion a chain of events that could cause additional future harms.
Moreover this problem extends beyond contaminated real property.
Personal property contaminated with toxic substances, such as oil
containing PCB's, can cause harm at any time. If the oil containers
deteriorate, the oil can cause harm in the future. In a sense, the

122. Bankruptcy Code § 503(b)(1). For a discussion of this contradiction, see Meth, s-upra
note 54, at 10-12 (discussing, among other cases, the lower court's opinion in In re Chateaugay,
112 B.R. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd 944 F.2d 997 (1991) (for a discussion of the court of appeals
decision in this case, see infra text accompanying notes 152-76 and 215-17)).
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failure to clean up contaminated real property or to remove the oil is
itself a new harm. This harm arises when the responsible party does
not perform needed preventive acts and the oil is not properly disposed
of or the tanks are not repaired.
For example, if a hotel files a bankruptcy proceeding and pre-petition damage to its elevator caused a pre-petition injury, the injury
would be a pre-petition claim. If, however, the elevator still needs
repair post-petition and it injures a customer post-petition, that customer would have a "claim." However, the claim would be a post-petition obligation. 1 Similarly, the cost to repair the elevator post-petition also should be a post-petition obligation since the expense avoids
the potential future injuries. The trustee or debtor-in-possession or
creditors' committee often decide whether to make the repair based
upon a cost-benefit analysis. Depending on the facts, post-petition
repair may save the estate money, since it may cost less to repair
the elevator than to compensate post-petition victims. If the repair is
made, it is a post-petition obligation even though the acts giving rise
to the need for repair occurred pre-petition. The debtor-in-possession
or trustee is similar to the owner of the contaminated site.
There is a similar argument for the party that manufactured and
installed the elevator before filing a bankruptcy petition. This person
is similar to the "generator," "transporter," or "former owner" of the
contanimated site. The defective product is in the hotel. There are
persons it has not yet injured. If injuries resulting from post-petition contact with the defective elevator would be post-petition injuries,m then arguably the cost of avoidance and repair should be also
post-petition obligations.
This post-petition liability can be based on two theories. First,
because any further harm resulting from the current condition creates
a post-petition obligation, the cost of avoidance also is a post-petition
obligation. Second, the failure to correct the risk is itself a new act
on which liability can rest. This act may be the failure to repair or
to warn of the danger. Since this act, or failure to act, occurs post-petition, any corresponding liability is a post-petition obligation.
According to either theory, a new obligation has been created. The
pre-petition obligation might be dischargeable and subject to the bank-

123. Most likely, it would be an administrative expense under Reading v. Brown, 391 U.S.
471 (1968).
124. Whether these injuries would be post-petition is unclear. Some courts have held that
they are. See In re Pettibone, 90 B.R. 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); infra text accompanying
notes 204-07. A full analysis of the question of when an obligation arises in the products liability
cases and the mass tort cases is left for another day.
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ruptcy proceeding. However, there is a new obligation in its place.
The two obligations may or may not be identical - a point discussed
below.
The toxic waste situation is similar to the defective elevator example. The ongoing risk of injury to people or the environment creates
a post-petition obligation either to compensate future victims or to
clean up. However, the toxic waste case is even more extreme than
the product liability case. Not only can both the exposure causing the
injury and the injury's manifestation occur well into the future, but
also the exposure to the contaminant and the injury's manifestation
may occur at different times.
While the toxic waste situation is similar to the mass tort cases
in some ways, it is different in one significant way. In mass tort cases,
the courts often assume, correctly or not, that all those who would
ever experience an injury had already been exposed to the product
pre-petition. For example, in asbestos cases, most of those who would
eventually suffer from an absestos related disease had been exposed
to the asbestos before the bankruptcy filing. Only the manifestation
of the actual harm had not occurred yet. In contrast, in the toxic
waste situation, the future victims have not yet encountered the
hazard. 1
In other words, a toxic waste site exposes more people, natural
resources, plants and animals, to new injury every day it remains
contaminated, although the initial need for a cleanup was based on
pre-petition acts. In short, environmental contamination creates both
past and future harm. The current property owner's continuing obligation to clean up, and the continuing failure of other responsible parties
to clean up or to warn of danger, are ongoing acts that create new
liabilities. These new liabilities arise post-petition.

125. If persons were exposed to asbestos following the bankruptcy proceeding, the environmental and mass tort situations are more analogous. Those injuries resulting from post-petition
exposure should also be considered post-petition obligations. So, for example, assume that a
debtor was ordered pre-petition to remove all of the asbestos from all buildings in which it had
installed the product. Assume further that after the bankruptcy proceeding was filed the debtor
failed to remove all of the asbestos. The failure to eliminate the danger is a post-petition act.
If a person was then exposed to the asbestos post-petition and suffered a related illness, that
injury is post-petition in nature. As such, the obligation to remove the asbestos arises every
day and is thus a post-petition obligation, although the order requiring the removal was entered
pre-petition and based on pre-petition acts. Injury occurring from post-petition exposure is a
post-petition harm. Removing the asbestos post-petition is arguably a post-petition expense
since it avoids the more costly expense of compensating victims. The courts that have handled
the mass tort cases have not decided the issue discussed in the text. See generally infra notes
210-13 and accompanying text.
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Individual Chapter 7 debtors receive a discharge of all pre-petition
obligations, and Chapter 11 debtors receive a discharge of pre-confirmation obligations. Thus, it is critical to determine the portions of the
liability that "arose" pre- and post-petition. In the toxic waste situation, pre- and post-petition obligations are not necessarily identical.
Since the post-petition liability is based on post-petition harms or risk
of harms, the portion of the obligation that arises post-petition must
be determined. The corrective action required post-petition must correspond to the need to avoid future harm. If, for example, the toxic
waste poses no threat of future harm (i.e., waste is contained fully
and safely) there is no new obligation. In such a case, the cleanup
responsibility is fully pre-petition, and does not "arise" again post-petition. If only a portion of the waste poses a threat, then the extent
of the post-petition obligation must be determined. A full cleanup
might not be necessary to avoid future harm.
I Apportioning the obligation into its pre- and post-petition compo6
nents may be quite difficult and certainly will present problems.1
Several methods of allocation exist. First, one could compare the cost
of cleanup pre-petition with the cost of cleanup post-petition. If the
cost has increased post-petition due to the spread of the toxic substances, rather than general cost increases, then the amount of the
increase is the portion that "arose" post-petition.
Second, one could calculate the expected cost of all post-petition
obligations resulting from the continued failure to cleanup. This calculation would include both the amount of the potential obligations and
the likelihood that they will occur. This figure can then be compared
with the cost of cleanup. If the cleanup cost is less, the entire cost
of cleanup is arguably a post-petition obligation because cleanup would
avoid greater costs. The administrative expense concept supports this
view. Under this view, the trustee, debtor-in-possession, or the cre-

126. Apportionment raises additional practical problems. For example, who will determine
when the potential injuries are great enough to warrant immediate cleanup? Can this determination be made timely? Are the debtor-in-possession and interested parties the appropriate
persons to make this decision? They will have to determine the costs of cleanup versus the
likely costs of compensating victims and the government for other damages (such as injury to
persons and to wildlife) in the future if they fail to cleanup. Because the cost of cleanup is often
less than the cost of compensating future victims (in present-day dollars) a cost-benefit analysis
should lead these parties to cleanup the dangerous sites. This assumes, however, that the
corporate management is (1) rational in its economic analysis and (2) not short-sighted, i.e.,
interested in the long run. These are two risky assumptions especially given the fact that this
corporation is already in bankruptcy. If the state or federal government decides that these
parties are likely to make these assessments incorrectly so as to delay cleanup, those legislatures
may respond and implement procedures for determining when cleanups must take place.
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ditors' committee would spend the money to clean up only when
cleanup costs are less than the amount they anticipate will be required
to pay future claimants. They would make this decision to "preserve"
the estate. Thus, the cleanup cost would, in some cases, be an administrative expense.
This relationship between pre-petition acts and administrative expenses shows the dual nature of these obligations. This apparent contradiction creates confusion. When an estate fully pays for a cleanup,
the EPA's claim is extinguished. In effect, the EPA's claim has been
"paid in full," even though it also might have been considered as
having arisen pre-petition. Yet, the ongoing nature of the harm from
contamination shows that a cleanup obligation may arise anew post-petition.
As in the case of post-petition liability based on current ownership,
this theory of post-petition liability also provides a bridge for the
courts that have considered post-petition cleanup by the government
to be an administrative expense. It provides a ground on which to
classify a portion of the cleanup claim as post-petition.
C.

Definitions and Timing: Summary

When a person, whether individual or corporate, is ordered to
clean up a contaminated site, the difficult question is how to treat
that obligation in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. The treatment
of the obligation depends on (1) whether the obligation is considered
a "claim" and (2) when it is deemed to "arise." These are not easy
determinations.
In some cases of toxic waste pollution the government may either
order a cleanup or perform a cleanup itself and order reimbursement.
An order to cleanup with a payment alternative is a "claim" in bankruptcy. However, the debtor might continue to be liable after bankruptcy if (1) the debtor again becomes the owner of the contaminated
property, through reorganization or abandonment, or (2) the debtor
was responsible for the cleanup and the contaminated site will cause
future harm. In either case, the obligation arises anew post-petition.
The current owner or operator is responsible for the full cost of
cleanup under CERCLA. When the debtor was the owner of the
contaminated property pre-petition, the estate is responsible under
CERCLA as current owner or operator. When the debtor was a responsible party, whether as current owner or in another capacity such
as a generator, and the site continues to be harmful, the government
or courts must bifurcate any "cleanup or pay up" obligation into its
past and future components. If the continuing contamination poses
continuing risks, then payments for any post-petition injuries are post-
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petition obligations. To the extent a cleanup will prevent these post-petition injuries, the associated cost also should be considered a post-petition obligation.
The cleanup obligations are often "claims" since they are based
on or have an alternative substitute in the payment of money. However, because they arise post-petition, they are not treated or dis1
charged along with the pre-petition claims in the bankruptcy process. 27
III.

DEFINITIONS AND TIMING: INTERPRETATIONS
FROM THE COURTS

A.

Definitions: Are Cleanup Obligations "Claims?"

Since the 1985 Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. Kovacs, 28 several
courts have considered whether a cleanup obligation is a "claim" and
therefore dischargeable in the case of the individual debtor. Two circuit
courts of appeals have addressed the question and reached different
results. 129The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States
v. Whizco, Inc. 13 0 held that an injunction requiring an individual debtor
to clean up was a "claim" to the extent the debtor had to spend money
to clean up. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re
Chateaugay3' recently held that some injunctive orders issued to a
corporate debtor are "claims," while others are not.
One bankruptcy appellate panel and several district courts have
considered the same question. Other courts have decided related issues. The next section discusses the leading cases. In 1988, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided Whizco.a 2 In that case the
federal government had obtained an injunction against the corporate

127. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text. Recall that the distinction for the
purposes of the timing question is between pre- and post-petition obligations although for the
purposes of discharge in a Chapter 11 case, the dividing line is confirmation.
128. 469 U.S. 274 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 85-98 for a discussion of this
case.
129. Other courts have considered a similar question in the context of the automatic stay.
See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984),
which held that the government's attempt to enforce a cleanup order was not an attempt to
enforce a money judgment, which would have been stayed by § 362(a)(2) and (b)(5). Recently,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d
164 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992), which involved the discharge of CERCLA
obligations in a bankruptcy proceeding under the former Bankruptcy Act. See also infranote 216.
130. 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988).
131. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
132. Whizco, 841 F.2d at 147.
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defendant (Whizco) and its operator to comply with a federal government order to reclaim an abandoned coal mine.1- The United States
sued Whizco and its operator, an individual named Leuking, to enforce
the reclamation order. 1'-4 Leuking, Whizco, and a related company had
filed Chapter 11 proceedings, which were converted to Chapter 7
proceedings within two weeks. The District Court entered the requested injunction against the defendant, Whizco.3 5 The parties had
stipulated that Leuking, as the agent of Whizco, "was potentially
subject to the same injunctive relief, . . .was unable to perform the
affirmative reclamation action personally, and that his debts had been
discharged in [the] Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. ....,136
Mr. Leuking was sixty-three years old, had given up his mining
equipment in the bankruptcy proceeding, and was not physically able
to perform the cleanup himself. As a result, Leuking argued, because
he could reclaim the land only by spending money, the obligation was
in effect a right to payment.137 Therefore, Leuking argued, the obligation was a "claim," discharged as a debt in bankruptcy.'1
The government had no alternative right to the payment of money
under the relevant statute. 13 9 The government had never sought money
from the debtor, but sought only a purely equitable remedy. Thus,
the government argued that Leuking's obligation was not a "claim"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and was not discharged. 140
The Court of Appeals reviewed the Kovacs case and noted that
the Supreme Court had relied heavily on the fact that the State of
Ohio sought money from Mr. Kovacs for the cost of cleanup. The
Whizco court noted that, unlike Kovacs, the government did not seek
4
any money from Leuking to apply to the cleanup costs.1 '
Nonetheless, Leuking would have to "hire others to perform the
work for him. This would require the expenditure .of money. Thus,
although the terms of the injunction would not require the payment

133. Id. at 147-48. The order was issued by the Secretary of the Interior under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988). The permit under
which Whizco operated required it to reclaim any surface area it had disturbed by mining. Id.
134. Id. at 148.
135. The suit against Whizco and Leuking continued in spite of the filing of the bankruptcy
proceedings presumably under the exception to the automatic stay found in § 362(b)(4)-(5).
However, the case does not address this issue.
136. Id. at 149.
137. Id. at 150.
138. Id. at 149-50.
139. Id. at 148.
140. Id. at 150.
141. Id.
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of money, to the extent that the injunction were to be effective, it
would.' ' 2 The court concluded that, regardless of the nominal form
of the relief, the United States was "really seeking payment.''4 As
a result, the court held that to the extent Leuking would have to
spend money to comply with the reclamation order, the obligation was
a 'liability on a claim," and, therefore, a "debt" within the meaning
of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, that obligation was discharged in
the bankruptcy proceeding. However, the court said its holding was
"very narrow.'" Specifically, the court said that if Leuking could
comply with the order without spending money, the obligation was
not discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding. In the future, if Leuking
owned equipment with which he could personally reclaim the land,
145
then the obligation was not discharged to that extent.
In Whizco, the government had no right to substitute money for
performance and did not seek money from the debtors. 46 Possibly
mindful of Kovacs, the government sought only to enforce its equitable
remedy. Nonetheless, the court held that the obligation of the individual defendant was dischargeable to the extent the debtor would have
to spend money to reclaim the site. The Whizco decision departs from
the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "claim" and "debt." In Whizco,
the government was entitled to a purely equitable remedy that was
not reducible to money. As such, the obligation was not within the
Code's definition of "claim." Therefore, the obligation was ot a "debt"
and not dischargeable under section 727(b).147

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 151.
145. Id.
146. As noted in the text, the government had no specific right to money from the debtors
and did not seek money. Id. at 150. Whether the government could seek money from the debtor
when only entitled to purely equitable remedies raises a separate question. In Whizco, the
parties agreed that the remedy was purely equitable. Id. Yet, as a practical matter, if the
government were to pursue the matter with Leuking, both parties might agree to a settlement
requiring Leuking to pay money rather than cleanup the site. Further, the government might
have the ability to "actualize" a right to pursue the debtors' assets through the appointment of
a receiver, as in Kovacs, or through some other mechanism pursuant to a statute or court order.
Although the government had no right to a money judgment under the environmental statute,
the government might settle ultimately for money or for some rights to control the debtor's
assets and forego its equitable claim. Governments are left in the precarious situation of demanding actual compliance and foregoing settlement and other options because their actions might
be construed to mean they have a "claim," which is ultimately dischargeable in a later bankruptcy
proceeding.
147. For a more detailed explanation, see supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
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One could argue, however, that in defining the term "claim" to
include "[the] right to an equitable remedy for breach ... [that]...
gives rise to a right to a right to payment," Congress intended to
include obligations that were fundamentally monetary.1- If Congress
intended to discharge individual debtors of all past obligations 149 that
would require expenditure of their future income or assets, the Whizco
decision naturally follows. To continue to enforce an equitable order
when compliance requires the debtor to spend money in the future is
arguably inappropriate from such a broad policy perspective when the
debtor's obligations had been discharged. '
However, this policy-based analysis does not focus closely enough
on the statutory language. Congress decided that the statutory definition of "claim" should exclude those purely equitable obligations.
Moreover, Congress implied in the statutory "right to payment" language that some claimant has the right to payment from the debtor.
This language implies a nexus between the claimant and the debtor.
This nexus is not necessarily the same as a debtor's having to pay
someone else to comply with an order. For example, in Whizco the
government did not have the right to recover payment from the debtor.
The possibility of the debtor's having pay someone to perform the
cleanup in order to comply with the order is different from a claimant's
having the right to payment.
In a sense, either the Whizco court went too far or not far enough.
If one adheres to the statutory language and the congressional intent,
Whizco went too far by transforming a purely equitable remedy into

148. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
149. The discharge or "fresh start" permits the debtor to retain future earnings free of
past obligations. Yet, Congress has provided several exceptions to the bankruptcy discharge.
See Bankruptcy Code § 727(a) (regarding denial of the discharge completely) and § 523(a)
(regarding exceptions to discharge for certain debts). It has been suggested that environmental
obligations such as the one in Whizco be added to the list of non-dischargeable debts. See Linda
Johannsen, Note, United States v. Whizco, Inc.: A FurtherRefinement of the Conflict Between
Bankruptcy Discharges and Environmental Cleanup Obligations, 20 ENVTL. L. 207, 224-27
(1990). While such a solution might have some deterrent effect, it is unlikely to add substantially
to the funding of cleanup as individuals generally do not have and will not acquire after bankruptcy the financial resources required to pay for a cleanup. A better solution, although still
only partial, is for the government to enact liens and superliens on the property and possibly
the other assets of the debtor.
150. See Whizco, 841 F.2d at 149-51. Further, the obligation is based on past acts and
should arguably be discharged. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 73. One could extend this
reasoning to argue that all cleanup obligations should be discharged even if the debtor later
acquires machinery with which it can cleanup the site since this limitation arguably interferes
with Leuking's "fresh start." See infra text accompanying note 151.
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a dischargeable "claim." However, if one reads the Bankruptcy Code
as intending to give the individual debtor a "fresh start," then Whizco
did not go far enough because it limits the debtor's ability to pursue
his or her occupation. By holding that the debtor must use any mining
equipment he may come to have in the future, the Whizco court discouraged the debtor from ever again engaging in one occupation he
knew. 151 Finally, one can argue that Congress, not the judiciary is the
body responsible for creating exceptions to discharge. Therefore, the
courts should not effectively create exceptions to discharge through
interpreting the section 101(5)(B) definition of "claim."
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered environmental cleanup obligations in bankruptcy in Chateaugay.152 In
Chateaugay, the debtor was potentially responsible for cleaning up
many sites around the country. The debtor informed the government
that it expected to discharge all of the potential response costs through
confirmation of its Chapter 11 plan. In response, the government
brought a declaratory judgment action to establish that the cost of
post-petition cleanups would not be dischargeable20 The court considered three aspects of the case: First, whether the debtor's cleanup
obligations were "claims"; second, whether injunctions ordering the
debtor to cleanup were "claims" and therefore dischargeable; and third,
which expenses, if any, that the government paid post-petition were
entitled to administrative priority. Regarding the question of whether
future cleanup obligations were claims, the Chateaugay court cited
the statutory definition of claim and noted congressional intent to give
the term a broad meaning.'5

151. See Whizco, 841 F.2d at 150-51. The exception, carved out in Whizco, discourages the
debtor from ever again being a mine owner or operator. Since this may be the only profession
the debtor knows this limitation arguably interferes with the debtor's freedom from past obligations. Thus, it would have made more sense for the court to discharge all obligations based on
the past events without respect to the debtor's future capability. On the other hand, the debtor
was a failure in the past as a mine operator and was a violator of environmental laws so perhaps
the effective limit on his future ability to engage in mining (via requiring cleanup) is ultimately
appropriate.
152. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 997. This case is part of the bankruptcy proceedings of the
LTV Corporation and its related companies.
153. It is not clear why the government took this path rather than voting against confirmation of the plan of reorganization except that perhaps its share of the outstanding debt was not
sufficient to have an impact on the outcome of the voting and ultimate plan confirmation. See
Bankruptcy Code § 1126(c) regarding the weight of the creditors votes in the voting process.
154. Id. at 16. The court discussed the analysis of Professor Baird and Dean Jackson both
with respect to the term "claim" generally and to the term "claim" in the environmental context.
See supra text accompanying notes 99-103. Regarding the term generally, the court referred
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In Chateaugay, the court rejected the most extreme positions. It

rejected the government's argument that there could be no "claim"
until the government had incurred costs under CERCLA because that
is when a cause of action technically arises under CERCLA. At the

opposite extreme, the court rejected the debtor's argument that all
obligations which result from pre-petition conduct are "claims." In the
court's view, this argument presented "enormous practical and perhaps
constitutional problems. . .. ,,55
In rejecting the debtor's argument that future injuries based on
pre-petition conduct are claims, the court discussed the approach taken
in mass tort and contract cases. In mass tort cases, most courts decline
to hold that the future victims have claims.156 Conversely, in contract

cases, most courts hold that obligations which arose from events within
the contemplation of the parties were "claims." The Chateaugaycourt
found these ideas not to be easily "transferable from the context of
contracts to that of tort or statutory claims.' ' 7 However, the court

to its idea that an obligation was a "claim" if the claimant could pursue the debtor's assets, id.
at 17, but said that the Baird and Jackson definition was not necessarily the one enacted by
Congress. Recall that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the court that had
decided In re Villarie, 648 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1981). The court in Chateaugayapproved in passing
its decisions in Villarie by explaining that in Villarie, the claimant did not have a "claim" within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code because it could not sue the debtor on the obligation.
Chateaugay,944 F.2d at 1003. However, as noted earlier, in Villaire the claimant did have the
right to pursue some of the debtor's assets (his wages so long as he worked for the same
employer). Villarie, 648 F.2d at 812. Recently, the Supreme Court has held that a mortgagee
that could not sue the debtor on the underlying obligation because the personal obligation had
been discharged in an earlier Chapter 7 proceeding, and could only reach the property subject
to the mortgage had a "claim." Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991). See supra
note 101 and accompanying text. Thus, the Second Circuit's decision in Villarie is questionable.
155. Id. at 1003. The court used the example of a company which builds a bridge and can
predict that ten people will die from its activities. It files a bankruptcy petition before anyone
is injured.
156. Id. at 1003-04 (citing Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 944 (3d
Cir. 1988); In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 58 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Amatex
Corp., 30 B.R. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983), af.f/d, 37 B.R. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985); In re UNR Indus., 29 B.R. 741, 744-46 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1983), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Gladding, 20 B.R. 566, 567-68
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982)). Many of these cases are discussed infra text accompanying notes 214-16.
The court incorrectly states that the court in Johns-Manville was one of the courts to rule
that the future victim did have a claim despite the lack of a manifested injury. Id. at 1004. The
court cited the wrong Johns-Manville case. The one the Chateaugay court cited involved a
property damage claimant. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
The Chateaugay court should have cited the Johns-Manville case that involved the status of
the future personal injury victims in which the court ruled only that they were entitled to be
represented. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
157. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1004-05.
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found a sufficient relationship between the debtor and the government
to include as "claims" most obligations for payment based on pre-petition conduct, including those that mature in the future. 11 The court

recognized the problem of notice and whether cleanup of a site of
which the EPA is unaware can be dischargeable. The court correctly
viewed this problem as making the claim contingent, rather than rendering the obligation outside of the definition of "claim."159 Therefore,
a claim that resulted "from pre-petition conduct fairly giving rise to
that contingent claim" would be dischargeable.16°
The Chateaugay court's conclusion is logically sound. Once the
EPA receives notice of a bankruptcy, it needs to investigate, depose,
review records, et cetera. While the EPA currently may lack the
personnel to perform these tasks, that should not affect judicial interpretation of the definition of "claim" and, thus, dischargeability.
Other agencies have recognized the benefits of commiting resources
to enforcement. For example, the Internal Revenue Service has recognized a return of the investment of hiring additional employees for
its collection divisions. The EPA might reach this conclusion also.
Further, the EPA need not investigate fully, so as to fix absolutely
the amount of its claim. So long as it identifies the sites involved and
gathers sufficient facts on which to estimate a claim, the claim amount
can be estimated pursuant to section 502(c). Based on this estimation,
the EPA can vote on the plan of reorganization. In addition, the EPA
can request the court to set aside sufficient funds to pay its portion
of the claim when the amount is finally fixed or allowed by the bank1 61
ruptcy court.

The court concluded that cleanup costs incurred in the future by
the EPA due to past contamination were "claims" within the meaning

158. Id. at 1005.
159. Id. The court stated that although the EPA may not yet know the full extent of the
damage or the costs of cleanup, the location of the sites and the cleanup costs "are all steps
that may be viewed, in the regulatory context, as rendering EPA's claim 'contingent' rather
than as placing it outside the definition of 'claim."' Id. at 1005. For a further discussion of the
problems created by insufficient notice, see infra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
160. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005. The court thus agreed with the district court. The

court notes that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit recently agreed with
this view in Jensen. Id. (citing Jensen, 127 B.R. at 33).

The court also rejected the government's argument that it could not rule on the issue because
CERCLA prohibits pre-enforcement review. This declaratory judgment action and the bankruptcy hearing that might follow to estimate the EPA's claim for the purposes of determining
its involvement in the proceeding were not within CERCLA's prohibition. Id. at 1005-06.
161. Finally, the court in Chateaugaygoes on to discuss briefly the timing issue, discussed
later in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 216-19.
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of the Bankruptcy Code. However, the court addressed separately
the obligations which were the subject of injunctions compelling the
debtor to cleanup contaminated sites.
The court's discussion of the types of injunctions which were
"claims" and ultimately dischargeable and which were not is somewhat
unclear. After quoting the section 101(5)(B) definition of claim,16 the
court referred to the Baird-Jackson view that this definition is intended
to distinguish between equitable obligations aimed at future violations
and those arising out of the debtor's past action. 163 However, the court
noted that this interpretation is not the Code definition.I
The court noted that the two categories mentioned by Baird and
Jackson are not "mutually exclusive. ' 16. It noted that some orders to
clean up both remedy a past act and prevent future pollution:
These injunctions, as we have noted, frequently combine an
obligation as to which the enforcing agency has an alternative
right to payment with an obligation as to which no such
alternative exists. An injunction that does no more than
impose an obligation entirely as an alternative to payment
is dischargeable. Thus, if the EPA directs [the debtor] to
remove some wastes that are not currently causing pollution,
and if the EPA could have itself incurred the costs of removing such wastes and then stes [the debtor] to recover the
response costs, such an order is a "claim" under the Code.
On the other hand, if the order, no matter how phrased,
requires [the debtor] to take any action that ends or ameliorates current pollution, such an order is not a "claim."166
In Chateaugay, the court did not divide the equitable obligations
simply according to whether they created a right to payment if
breached. Rather, the court held that the injunction is a "claim" only
if (1) it directs the debtor to cleanup wastes that are not currently
causing pollution and (2) the EPA could cleanup the site and then
seek reimbursement. 167 Conversely, the court held that the order, "no
matter how phrased," is not a "claim" if it requires the debtor to take
"action that ends or ameliorates current pollution."16

162. This section is quoted supra text accompanying note 63.
163. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1006-07; see supra text accompanying notes 102-03 for a
discussion of the Baird and Jackson view.
164. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1007.
165. Id.
166. Id at 1008 (emphasis added).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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This distinction creates two problems. First, the Chateaugaycourt
altered the statute as it is written. The court failed to respect the
statutory distinction concerning those obligations which have an alternative right to seek payment of money. As the court pointed out,
CERCLA itself allows the EPA to clean up a site and gain reimbursement from the responsible person. 169 Before Chateaugay, some courts
had held that a cleanup obligation is not a "claim" if the statute on
which it is based does not allow the government this option. 170 For

example, Kovacs involved an environmental statute that created no
alternative right to seek money.17 1 In Kovacs, the Supreme Court held
that the obligation was a "claim" only when the government had effectively pursued the debtor's assets by actually taking steps to have a
receiver appointed pursuant to a general state statute that dispossessed the debtor rendering him unable to perform the cleanup."72 In
Chateaugay, the Second Circuit added a requirement not in the statute: the obligation is a claim only if there is no ongoing pollution,
regardless of the government's ability to seek money in the alternative
to enforcing cleanup.
In addition, the Chateaugaycourt confused the definition of "claim"
with the timing of the "claim." The court held that cleanup obligations
are not "claims," and therefore not dischargeable, if cleanup will end
or "ameliorate" current pollution. 73 However, this is a timing issue,
not a definitional issue. To conform to the statute, as well as to be
clearer, the court could have found the cleanup obligation to be a
"claim," but a claim that arose every day to the extent that either (1)
the debtor continued to own the property or (2) the debtor continued
to cause pollution or to pose the threat of further harm to the environment. 7 4 As such, this claim or series of claims arose post-petition and

169.

Id at 1001.

170. See United States v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160 (W.D. Pa.), affd 928 F.2d 1131 (1990);
infra text accompanying notes 179-86.
171. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 280 (1985).
172. Id. at 282-85; see supra text accompanying notes 85-98. The court in Chateaugay
distinguished Kovacs since in Kovacs the state had sought money from the debtor. Chateaugay,
944 F.2d at 1008. As discussed earlier, it was not the mere fact that the state sought money,
but the fact the state law provided a procedure by which the state could dispossess the debtor
and the state had used that procedure placing the debtor in a position in which he could no
longer perform. Id.
Some courts have gone one step further and held that the obligation is nonetheless a "claim"
even if there is no express alternative to money. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988); see
supra text accompanying notes 130-51.
173. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
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would continue to arise every day until remedied. Therefore, the EPA
would not be a "creditor," and could not file a proof of claim for these
costs. To the extent the obligations continued post-confirmation, they
175
would not be discharged.
The court partially resolved these concerns by casting the order
to clean up in the following way: The EPA has the right to clean up
and seek reimbursement. However, if the EPA does not clean up, it
may not accept money as an alternative to the continued pollution. 176
Therefore, the order to clean up a site that continues to cause pollution
does not create an alternative right to money and is not a "claim."
This explanation provides an interesting perspective on those
categories of obligations which concern continuing pollution. The position taken in this article is that there are two separate inquiries: (1)
the definitional, regarding whether the obligation is a "claim" and, if
so, (2) the timing, regarding when the claim "arose." However, the
Chateaugay court conflated the two inquiries. Although the government could have cleaned up and sought money (rendering the obligation a "claim"), the government. could not accept money in place of
the failure to cleanup in the future. Thus, under Chateaugay, the
ongoing nature of the obligation to clean up a contaminated site, which
arguably renders the obligation post-petition 177 and does not create an
alternative right to payment, is excluded from the very definition of
"claim." Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity, the ultimate problem of
dischargeability in cases such as Chateaugay is better addressed as
one of timing rather than claim definition. The two questions (definition
and timing) are better addressed separately.
The position taken by the court in Chateaugaycauses an additional
concern. It creates an incentive for the EPA to avoid cleaning up
sites. Congress has established the Superfund so that dangerous sites
can be cleaned up quickly, without the need to establish liability or
to wait until someone complies with a cleanup order. Following
Chateaugay, the EPA may delay cleanup to ensure that it does not

175. As noted earlier, Bankruptcy Code § 1141(d)(1) provides that all debts that arose
pre-confirmation are discharged. This leaves a gap between the filing of the petition and the
time of confirmation. Some obligations will fall into the category of administrative expenses.
Some might not, however, and thus the question is how to categorize those obligations. For
simplicity I have treated these obligations as though they are either (1) not subject to the
discharge or (2) administrative expenses (as discussed in Part IV).
176. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
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transform an obligation into a dischargeable claim. 178 This is only a
small part of the picture, however. To decide how the system should
work, we must also determine other issues, such as the government's
priority in recovering cleanup costs, or whether liens or superliens
are appropriate.
Several district courts and one bankruptcy appellate panel have
considered whether particular environmental obligations are "claims"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. These cases (1) continue
the Supreme Court's theories and distinction in Kovacs and (2) show
a difference of opinion regarding the broad holding in Whizco that

anything potentially requiring the expenditure of money is a claim.
For example, the court in United States v. Hubler 79 considered a
situation almost identical to Whizco but reached the opposite conclusion. In Hubler, a partnership had been mining illegally and was
ordered by the federal government to restore the affected land. 180
Both the partnership and its individual partners (who were also respon-

sible for the restoration) had filed Chapter 11 petitions, which were

later converted to Chapter 7 petitions. 181 The individual partners
claimed that their obligations to backfill and regrade the affected land
were discharged as part of their bankruptcy proceedings. The government sued to compel the individuals to comply with the restoration
order. The government argued that the obligation was not a "claim"
because the government sought only enforcement of the restoration

178. The EPA's new "long term strategy" includes a preference for ordering responsible
parties to cleanup, rather than spending money from Superfund. EPA, A Management Review
of the Superfund Programi-ii, 2-2 to 2-6 (1989). Nonetheless, there are cases in which the EPA
should take action, cases in which the site is highly dangerous. In 1991, there were over 1,000
sites on the "National Priorities List," the list of the most dangerous sites in the country in
need of immediate cleanup. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1991). As of 1989 the EPA reported
that, "More than 30,000 sites have been identified as possible candidates for Superfund." EPA,
supra, at 2. The Chateaugay case can cause further delay of the cleanup of some of the most
hazardous sites given the disincentives for action on part of the EPA.
179. 117 B.R. 160 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 928 F.2d 1131 (1990).
180. The environmental law involved in this case was the same act involved in Whizco: the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988)) and specifically
30 U.S.C. §§ 1272(e)(4), 1271(c) and 1253(a) (1988).
The Secretary of the Interior had issued a cessation order under that act, requiring the
partners and the partnership to "backfill and regrade" the affected land. Hubler, 117 B.R. at 162.
181. Both of the individual partners' petitions had been filed subsequent to the issuing of
the order to restore the site. Hubler, 117 B.R. at 162-63. The partnership bankruptcy petition
had been filed after a notice of violation had been issued by the proper authorities but before
the order to correct the site was issued. Id. The court does not discuss this fact and seems to
focus on the bankruptcies of the individuals, although the case involved the partnership as well.
The focus here is on the individual partners' bankruptcies and not the partnership bankruptcy.
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order and could not demand payment of money. 182 The court agreed,
finding that the government had no right to demand payment from
the debtors but could only compel them to comply with the restoration
order. 18 Therefore, the obligation was not a "claim," and the debtors'
obligations to restore the property were not discharged in their bankruptcy proceedings.11
Hubler was the first case to hold that an individual debtor's environmental cleanup obligation was not a "claim" and thus not dischargeable
under the Bankruptcy Code. While other courts may have been protective of individual debtors and their right to a "fresh start" under
the Bankruptcy Code, the Hubler court was not overly solicitous in
this regard. The Hubler court rejected Whizco'- and followed more
closely both the definition of "claim" and the apparent intent of Con86

gress. 1

In contrast, the court in In re Torwico Electronics, Inc.-s7 held
that if a corporate debtor cannot clean up itself "without paying money,
the obligation to clean up pursuant to an injunction is a debt which
is dischargeable in bankruptcy." The court did not refer to Whizco
but reached its conclusion after analyzing Kovacs.
All courts have agreed that if an injunction has been effectively
reduced to money then the obligation is a "claim" and is discharge-

182. Id. at 164.
183. Id. at 164-65.
184. Id. at 165.
185. Id. at 164 n.1. The Hubler court had first noted that there are nine explicit exceptions
to the bankruptcy discharge contained in § 523(a) for individual debtors and environmental
obligations are not included in that list of nine. Id. at 163. The court then applied Kovacs and
used the explicit gap left by the Supreme Court in Kovacs to reason that here was a case in
which the environmental obligation was purely equitable in nature and for which a payment of
money could not be substituted. Id. at 163-64. In Hubler, the fact that the government at one
point had requested a performance bond, which request it later withdrew, did not affect the
court's decision. See id. at 163 n.2. The court said that the request of a performance bond did
not "constitute an attempt to convert the defendants' obligations into a monetary payment such
as that involved in Kovacs." Id. at 164. The court also relied on Penn Terra (an automatic stay
case) and cited with approval the decision in Chateaugay. Id.
186. Baird and Jackson presumably would agree with the results in Whizco and Kovacs,
and they would probably characterize the result in Hubler as incorrect. See Baird & Jackson,
supra note 36, at 1204. They recognize that an order to cleanup a site could technically be
outside of the definition of "claim" if there is no alternative right to payment. Id. They argue
that deciding the definitional issue on this ground is "mindlessly literal" because it "upsets the
order of entitlements that existed outside of bankruptcy." Id. Specifically, they point to the
fact that in the case of the corporate debtor, the state will not receive any distribution on the
obligation if it does not have a "claim" and the debtor is liquidating. Id. at 1203.
187. 131 B.R. 561 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1991).
188. Id. at 569.
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able.'8 In Chateaugay,the Second Circuit went one step farther. The
Chateaugay court emphasized that even if the statute allowed the
government to clean up and then seek reimbursement, if the government instead issued a cleanup order for a site that was continuing to
cause pollution, the cleanup obligation was not a "claim" and was not
dischargeable. 190 The Sixth Circuit in Whizco went still farther holding
that even a purely equitable obligation, such as an injunction, is dischargeable to the extent performance or compliance requires the expenditure of money. Torwico reached a similar conclusion in a case
involving a corporate debtor. On the other hand, some courts, such
as the court in Hubler, have disagreed with Whizco on this point.
These courts rejected the argument that because an injunction requiring cleanup would require the expenditure of money, it would be
dischargeable.
Kovacs, Whizco, and Hubler involved individual debtors, while
Chateaugay and Torwico involved reorganizing corporate debtors. In
the individual debtor cases, the discharge question is particularly important because the debtor will survive and may acquire future assets
or income. In the corporate context, if the debtor liquidates, the government's only chance for any recovery is to share in the distribution
in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Chateaugay and Torwico cases
involved Chapter 11 reorganizations. In a reorganization, if the obligations are not "claims" and not discharged, they are recoverable from
the reorganized corporation post-confirmation.
B.

Timing: When Does the Claim Arise?

1. Background: Tort and Mass Tort Cases
Once an environmental obligation is determined to be a "claim"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, the focus then shifts to
the timing question.' 9' Generally, courts hold that when an obligation
is based on the pre-petition acts of the debtor, it arose pre-petition,
even if the injury did not become apparent until after the proceeding
was filed. For example, in In re Edge 92 the debtors were two dentists
who negligently treated a patient pre-petition. The patient did not
discover the ifijury until after the dentists had filed bankruptcy petitions. The court held the patient's claim to be a pre-petition claim

189.
190.
191.

See Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 274; Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 997.
See supra text accompanying notes 152-78.
See supra text accompanying notes 45-50 for a discussion of. why the timing issue is

significant.
192.

60 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986).
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which was then allowed in the bankruptcy proceeding.' - The court
reasoned that the pre-petition negligent act created a potential right
to payment contingent on an injury ultimately arising. The patient
had this right pre-petition, even though she could not seek redress in
the state courts until she discovered the injury. The claim was therefore allowable under section 502(b)(1), because it was unenforceable
under non-bankruptcy law only because it was "contingent or unmatured."14 Thus, the claimant's "right to payment and thus a claim
' 95
arose at the time of the debtor's pre-petition misconduct.'
However, not all courts agree that a claim "arises" when the acts
on which it is based occur. In In re M. Frenville Co.,'- the court had
97
to decide when a claim arose for the purposes of the automatic stay.'
Before the bankruptcy petition was filed, the debtor's accounting firm
had prepared financial statements for the debtor, which the debtor
used in obtaining certain loans. After the debtor filed the bankruptcy
petition, several banks sued the accounting firm claiming that it had
prepared the financial statements negligently and recklessly.'
The accounting firm sought to include the debtor as a third party
defendant in the suit, claiming that the debtor had supplied incorrect
or misleading information and that if the accounting firm were liable
to the banks, then the debtor was ultimately liable.' 99 Thus, the acts

193. Id. at 705.
194. Id. at 699. The court noted the absurd effect that a contrary holding would have if
the debtor were a corporation. That is, if the claim were not allowed in the bankruptcy proceeding
and the hypothetical corporate debtor were liquidating, then there would be no opportuity for
the victim to recover against the debtor. Id. at 699 n.8. For a further discussion of this problem,
see supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
195. Edge, 60 B.R. at 705.
196. 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984).
197. Id. at 334. When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition all persons are stayed from suing
the debtor on any claim that "arose before the commencement" of the bankruptcy proceeding.
Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(1). Thus, if a claim "arose" before the bankruptcy proceeding it is
subject to the stay and the claimant may not sue the debtor. If, however, the claim is deemed
to arise after the petition is filed, the claimant is not subject to the stay.
198. Frenville, 744 F.2d at 333.
199. Id. at 334. Frenville exemplifies the strategic choices a creditor must make when
advancing a position regarding when a claim arises. By asserting that the claim "arose" post-petition, the accounting firm claimants were choosing to forego recovery against the corporate
debtors (absent an administrative expense argument) in favor of post-discharge recovery against
the individuals. Although, the caution must be given that funds could be set aside to pay claims
that arise after discharge or after dissolution in the case of a state corporate dissolution. The
bankruptcy petitions in Frenville involved a corporate debtor and two of its principals. Id. at
333-34. All were Chapter 7 proceedings. Technically, the financial statements were prepared
for the corporate debtor but the accounting firm sued all three debtors for contribution or
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that created any claim, that is, the providing of the financial information to the accounting firm, occurred pre-petition. Yet under the applicable state law, the accounting firm could not have sued the debtor
until the lenders sued the firm.m Therefore, the court held that the
accounting firm's claim "arose" at the earliest when it was sued. Because the lenders sued the firm post-petition, the firm had a post-petition claim. 201 This case has been criticized sharply by courts and
commentators alike.2 Courts explicitly have declined to follow it.2 °3

Products liability cases have presented timing problems for the
courts as well. In In re Pettibone Corp.,2 a victim was injured while

operating a forklift manufactured by the debtor before the debtor filed
a bankruptcy petition. The victim was injured post-petition, and had
not even been hired to operate the forklift, until after the bankruptcy

indemnity regarding the suit based on the financial statements. Id. If the accounting firm
claimant prevailed, it would be unable to recover against the corporate debtor since the debtor
was liquidating and would have no continuing being or assets from which it could satisfy any
post-petition claims. The individuals, however, would continue to exist and the accounting firm
could recover from them. Thus, the accounting firm must have determined that the individuals
would have assets or earnings in the future from which it could recover whereas there must
have been very little in the corporation from which the accounting firm could recover.
200. Id. at 335-36.
201. Id. at 337. Specifically, the accounting firm had a contingent claim when the suit was
instituted. The claim would become fixed if the accounting firm had to pay the judgment. Id.
The court also noted that although the accounting firm may have had some claim against the
debtors when they supplied the financial information, it was not the claim at issue here, which
was a claim for contribution or indemnification in the suit brought by the banks. Id.
Since the accounting firm had a post-petition claim, it was not subject to the automatic stay
and could include the debtor as a defendant in the suit.
202. See, e.g., Ralph R. Mabey & Annette W. Jarvis, In re Frenville: A Critique by the
National Bankruptcy Conference's Committee on Claims and Distributions, 42 Bus. L. 697
(1987); JACKSON, supra note 20, at 172-74. Criticisms include the fact that such a narrow reading
of when a suit "could" have been brought will lead to inconsistent results since cases having
identical facts can have different results based merely upon whether the creditor, which had
the third party claim against the debtor, was sued pre- or post-petition. Mabey & Jarvis, supra
at 704. That the court's reliance on state law was "misplaced" since the operation of the stay
is a question of federal bankruptcy law and all of the facts giving rise to the claim had taken
place pre-petition so that the suit could have been filed pre-petition, id., and that the court in
Frenville effectively reordered priorities by allowing the third party claimant to sue the debtor
and have its claim be considered post-petition, when the underlying facts on which the entire
transaction was based all took place before the bankruptcy filing. JACKSON, supra note 20, at
172-74.
203. See, e.g., Grady v. A.H. Robbins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988); Inre Johns-Manville
Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986).
The Third Circuit itself has distinguished this case from another that was not too unlike Frenville.
204. 90 B.R. 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
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petition was filed. The victim argued that the debtor was negligent
or strictly liable for manufacturing a faulty product. 20 5 The debtor
argued that the victim's claim arose pre-petition, when the debtor
manufactured the product.
Applicable state law required an injury to create a cause of action.
Therefore, the court said that if the victim had been injured by the
product pre-petition, or at least suffered the impact which caused the
injury, then the victim would have had a pre-petition claim.20 In this
case, however, the victim was first exposed to the product and suffered
20 7
his injury post-petition.
Courts have addressed the timing problem in a number of mass
tort cases. 208 In most of these cases, a claimant was usually exposed
to an item or substance pre-petition and discovered or might discover
an injury or illness post-petition. -For example, in one of the non-asbestos mass tort cases, Grady v. A.H. Robbins Co., 2°9 the plaintiff used
an I.U.D. prior to the bankruptcy of A.H. Robbins but discovered
the resulting injury post-petition. The court held that she had a pre-petition contingent claim. 2 1° Because the claim was contingent on the
eventual manifestation of an injury, the plaintiff was stayed from suing
the debtor. 21n However, the court disclaimed any decision regarding
the dischargeability of the claim.212

205. Id. at 921. The victim also argued that the debtor was negligent in its failure to warn
him of the dangers of operating the forklift. Id. at 920. Since the victim had not operated the
forklift pre-petition, the court held that if there were in fact a negligent failure to warn, then
the failure to warn claim was a post-petition claim with respect to the victim. Id. at 930. Finally,
the victim argued that his claim was entitled to priority as an administrative expense. Id. at
933. This subject is discussed generally infra text accompanying notes 246-52.
206. Pettibone, 90 B.R. at 932. The court discussed extensively the relevant cases. It
reviewed all of the mass tort cases as well as other cases on the subject of when a personal
injury "arises." Id. at 923-33.
207. Id.
208. The discussion of claims and the timing of claims in the mass tort context is brief and
intended to provide background to the courts' handling of these issues. For additional discussions
of problems that arise in the mass tort context, see Harvey J. Kesner, Future Asbestos Related
Litigants as Holders of Statutory Claims Under Chapter11 of the Bankruptcy Code and Their
Place in the Johns-Manville Reorganization, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69 (First Installment), 159
(Second Installment) (1988); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846
(1984); Anne Hardiman, Note, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of
Future Claims, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1369 (1985); Margaret I. Lyle, Note, Claims and the Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Versus the Common Law Tort System, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1297 (1983).
209. 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988).
210. Id. at 202-03.
211. Id. at 203.
212. Id.
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Timing has been an issue in the asbestos cases as well. Each case
involved a group of potential "future claimants" who had been exposed
to asbestos but who had not yet shown any symptoms of resulting

illness. These potential claimants might remain healthy, or they could
become ill as long as forty years later.213 Although the debtors predicted the percentage of persons who would eventually contract asbestos-related illnesses, they could not identify specific claimants. Ulti-

mately, most courts avoided the question altogether. Instead, they
held that the "future claimants" were entitled to be heard and represented in the bankruptcy proceeding. 214 Specifically, these courts

held that the future claimants were "parties in interest" under section

213. See, e.g., Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988).
214. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,
58 B.R. 476 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984), affd, 52 B.R. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
In two appellate cases, the lower courts had held that the future claimants did not have
claims that were cognizable in bankruptcy. In re Amatex Corp., 30 B.R. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1983); 755 F.2d 1034 (1985); In re UNR Indus., 29 B.R. 741, 745-46 (Bankr. D. Ill. 1983) (the
future claimants did not have claims within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and their
"claims" did not arise at or before the order for relief), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 1111 (7th
Cir. 1989).
In UNR, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of a
final order, but the appellate court noted that in its view the rights of these claimants should
be taken into account and implied that it would appoint a representative. UNR, 725 F.2d at
1119-20. On remand, the court followed the trend and appointed a legal representative for the
latter claimants. In re UNR Indus., 46 B.R. 671 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
The Seventh Circuit also considered the question of when a claim would arise. UNR, 725
F.2d at 1119. It said that some of the future claimants probably had already suffered a tort
since a cause of action in tort arises in some states upon inhalation of the asbestos and not upon
the later discovery of a disease. Id. Further, even in states in which the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until discovery, a person may still have suffered an injury upon inhalation
and the state would recognize that a tort had occurred. Id. Finally, even in a state that would
not recognize a tort until manifestation of an illness, the court suggested that a bankruptcy
court could use its equitable powers to "make provision for" the future claimants. Id.
In another case arising out of the Johns-Manville bankruptcy, two contractors sued for
property damage caused by the installation of asbestos (rather than for personal injury). The
contractors had installed asbestos prior to the bankruptcy petition and knew of possible problems
with the asbestos installation prior to the bankruptcy. The court held that they had "claims"
that were subject to the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(1) and (6). This case is
different from the cases involving the future personal injury cases in which exposure had occurred
but there was no indication at the time of filing of any injury.
The question of whether an injury occurs on exposure or not until manifestation of the
disease has been considered in related contexts as well. See North Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (insurance coverage applies on exposure).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

51

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

1109 and were entitled to be heard and represented.215 The courts

reasoned that if these future claimants were not represented in the
bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor would have to file a series of
bankruptcy proceedings as the claims "arose." The courts concluded
that this ultimately would harm all parties concerned. Further, if
might be nothing left for
future claimants were not considered, there
216
future.
the
in
recover
to
these claimants
2. Environmental Cases
Most of the Chateaugaydecision did not address the timing issue.
Further, the Chateaugay court sometimes confused definitional issues
with the timing issue.217 However, the court did consider the timing

question briefly when it rejected the government's argument that a
claim could not exist until the government incurred response costs for
pre-petition releases. 2 18 The Chateaugay court approved the lower

court's position that contingent claims were dischargeable when they
arose from the pre-petition conduct that resulted in a ' "pre-petition
219
release or threatened releases of hazardous substances."
215. Bankruptcy Code § 1109(b) permits any "party in interest" to be heard on any issue.
Some courts also relied on the general equitable powers of the court granted by § 105. Amatex,
755 F.2d at 1042; Forty-EightInsulations,58 B.R. at 476; Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 753, 759.
Since only "debts" arising before confirmation are dischargeable, the court in Johns-Manville
later had to find a way to bind these future claimants to the provisions of the bankruptcy
reorganization. If their claims were not discharged, they were not prohibited from suing the
reorganized debtor for a pre-petition claim under Bankruptcy Code § 524(a)(2). The Court
approved, over objection, an injunction contained in the plan of reorganization that prohibited

this class of future claimants from suing the reorganized debtor. In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). In effect, the future claimants "were treated identically
to the present claimants by virtue of the Injunction," although the court never held that they
technically were "creditors," i.e., those who hold claims that arose before the bankruptcy petition
was filed. See Kane, 843 F.2d at 640.
216. See Arnatex, 755 F.2d at 1042 ("failure to provide for future claimants in a reorganization plan might fatally undermine any such plan as well as prejudice the position of future
claimants"); Johns-Manille, 36 B.R. at 746. In Forty-Eight Insulations, the debtor was liquidat-

ing in Chapter 11 and thus if the future claimants were not taken into account in the proceeding
they would never have any recovery. Forty-Eight Insulations, 58 B.R. at 476-77.
217. See generally supra text accompanying notes 162-78 (regarding the injunctive obligations to cleanup). For other cases regarding the question of obligations that were dischargeable
or non-dischargeable under the former Bankruptcy Act, based largely on the timing or notice
question, see In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussed infra text
accompanying notes 236-38); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail, 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985).
218. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002-06.
219. Id. at 1005. This language referring to a "release or threatened release" of hazardous
substances has its source in CERCLA. It is upon such a release or threatened release that the
EPA may take action to cleanup or order a cleanup. CERCLA §§ 9604, 9606. The debtor is
liable for the related costs. CERCLA § 9607.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss2/1

52

Heidt: Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A Fundamental Framework
ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY

United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal220 concerned a
CERCLA suit brought by the EPA against more than twenty defendants for the recovery of $1,200,000 for cleanup and other response
costs at a contaminated site.22 1One of the debtors, Taracorp Industries,
Inc., had been reorganized through a Chapter 11 proceeding several
years before the EPA sued.2 Union Scrap Iron & Metal owned the
site when the EPA investigated and assessed it. The EPA did not
then know that Taracorp was connected to the site or might be responsible for any of the cleanup costs.2 The EPA's site assessment and
cleanup occurred after confirmation of Taracorp's plan of reorganization.m Although the EPA negotiated with Taracorp during its bankruptcy proceeding concerning two of Taracorp's other sites, it did not
2
raise any claim against Taracorp regarding the Union Scrap site. 25
The EPA argued that it did not know until 1989 that Taracorp had
any relation to the Union Scrap site.
Taracorp countered that the EPA's "claim" regarding the Union
22
Scrap site "arose" well before the bankruptcy petition was ffled. 6
The government argued that it could not have a "claim" until the EPA
actually incurred expenses, which occurred after the bankruptcy petition was filed.227

220. 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990).
221. Id. at 832.
222. Id. at 833. Taracorp had had its plan of reorganization confirmed on July 1, 1985. At
least one other defendant, Union Scrap Iron & Metal, had also been the subject of a bankruptcy
proceeding, but the status of the claims against Union Scrap were not the subject of this case.
223. Union Scrap processed batteries for Taracorp and other defendants at the site in
question. Id.
224. The work performed by the EPA and the State of Minnesota, which used Superfund
money, was performed between late 1985 and early 1988. In 1990, the EPA concluded that the
clean-up action was complete. Id. Evidently, the EPA had spent approximately $42,000 pre-petition in response costs, but those costs were not in question in this case. Id.
225. Id. at 833. The order confirming Taracorp's plan for reorganization specifically provided
that any governmental claim that was not filed in the proceeding and was not scheduled was
"disallowed, discharged, and forever barred." Id.
226. Id. at 834.
227. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 115. Interestingly, the government argued
that this position was necessary to protect the public health "by providing for immediate remedial
action by the EPA and later identification and bringing of claims against potentially responsible
parties (PRP's)." 123 B.R. at 834. This does not quite make sense, since if remedial action is
taken, then the money has been expended and there is a "claim." The government also went
on to argue that the immediate response goal of CERCLA would be "undermined" if the
government had to investigate and consider whether every debtor that filed a bankruptcy
petition was a potential responsible party. Id. This makes some sense in that the EPA would
have to begin focusing on all bankruptcy filings, which might take away from its other activities.
However, this requires simply an adjustment on the part of the EPA regarding personnel and
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The court examined the definition of "claim" as a "right to payment"
under section 101(5)(A).2 According to the court, a claim could "arise"
only when "all the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation
under the relevant substantive non-bankruptcy law" had occurred.
The court reviewed the relevant CERCLA provisions that give rise
to the obligation to pay the government for its costs and expenses.
Under that scheme, the government must have incurred costs before
it can recover.y ° The court concluded that the mere release of a hazardous substance is not sufficient to create a "claim" on which the government can act.3 1 Therefore, since the EPA had incurred no response
costs before confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 11 plan, the EPA
had no claim at the time of the bankruptcy proceeding. This view has
some logic to it: not all the requisites for having a right to recover
against the debtor occurred before confirmation of the plan. However,
like other courts, the Union Scrap court confused the questions of
2
whether a claim exists and when the claim arose.3

focus. See supra text following note 159. Further, as pointed out in the discussion of the
Chateaugaycase, if the EPA is permitted to wait and is then considered to have a post-petition
claim, the EPA may have an incentive to delay cleanup investigation. If a PRP is in financial
trouble, the EPA has an incentive to wait.
228. Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 835. Unlike Kovacs, Whizco and Hubler, this case did not
involve the right to injunctive relief. It is similar to the portion of Chateaugay that did not
concern the right to injunctive relief. The court read the definition of "claim" broadly in accordance with Kovacs, and then focused on the question of when the claim arose. Id.
229. Id. (citing In re UNR Indus., 29 B.R. 741, 745-46 n)4 (N.D. Ill. 1983)).
230. Specifically, the court lists the four well-established elements that the government
must prove before it is entitled to recovery under CERCLA: "(1) there must be a facility; (2)
there must be a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at the facility; (3) there
must be a responsible person (as defined by the statute); and (4) the United States must have
incurred necessary costs in responding to the release at the facility." Id. (citations omitted).
231. Id. at 835-36. Rather, the release "triggers the authority of the EPA to respond." Id.
232. Id. at 836. The court said the government had no claim in the proceeding. Id. This
phrasing can be read to mean timing. The pure "claim" question is usually not bound by any
time. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08. On the other hand, in order to have a "claim"
there must be a right of recovery under some law. And if this court's approach is taken, then
there is no right of recovery until response costs are incurred. The debtor also argued that the
liability to the EPA was a "contingent claim." As such, it would also be within the definition
of section 101(5) and dischargeable. The court disagreed, stating that in order to be a contingent
claim, the future contingency must be within the "actual or presumed contemplation of the
parties at the time the original relationship of the parties was created." Union Scrap, 123 B.R.
at 836 (citing In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980)). Here,
the EPA had no knowledge of the possibility that the debtor was involved in the Union Scrap
site. The court left open the question of whether the debtor might have had a better argument
had it disclosed its possible involvement in the site to the EPA or if the EPA had had independent
knowledge of the debtor's relationship to the site at the time of the bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
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The Union Scrap court distinguished the lower court decision in
Chateaugay(which held that the nature and timing of the claim could
not depend on when the government incurred response costs) on the
ground that Chateaugayinvolved a declaratory judgment. The Union
Scrap court said that the government still could pursue the debtor in
Chateaugayin its bankruptcy proceeding. In Union Scrap, however,
the debtor had received its discharge five years before the EPA
brought suit. Thus, if the court agreed with the debtor, it would be
too late for the government to pursue the debtor.2 However, the
Union Scrap court was clearly troubled by the EPA's inability to
learn of its claim against the debtor in time to participate in the
bankruptcy proceeding.
In reaching its decision, the Union Scrap court also considered
the policies and goals of CERCLA: responding quickly to hazardous
waste problems and placing the costs of cleanup on those responsible.2
The court agreed that for the EPA to act quickly, it must not be
forced to investigate all debtors that have ified bankruptcy proceedings
to determine whether it has a potential claim.2
Another recent case concerned a debtor which received its discharge before CERCLA was even enacted. In In re Penn Central
TransportationCo.,2 the court allowed several claimants to sue the
debtor for contribution for cleanup costs, despite a prior discharge
and "consummation order" prohibiting anyone from filing a suit against
the debtor based on any claim or interest "of any kind. '' 2 7

This knowledge requirement makes sense from a constitutional standpoint and from the perspective that there needs to be some relationship between the parties. See supra note 159. It is a
potential distinguishing factor between this case and Chateaugay. The knowledge factor is what
made the court extremely uncomfortable here.
233. Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 836. Other courts have been troubled by due process problems
whefi a particular creditor did not receive appropriate notice that its claim might be discharged
in bankruptcy. See Reliable Electric, Inc. v. Olson Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620, 622-23 (10th Cir.
1984).
The court also found relevant the fact that the hazard created by the debtor remained at
the site after the confirmation of the bankruptcy reorganization. Id. at n.5.
234. Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 837 (citing United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)).
235. Id. at 837. But see discussion supra following note 159; see also supra notes 227 &
232. Finally, the court discusses the lower court case in In re Jensen, 114 B.R. 700 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1990). The Jensen case, however, was recently reversed by the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel for the Ninth Circuit, 127 B.R. 27 (9th Cir. 1991).
236. 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991).
237. Id. at 165.
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Two points make this case different from the other cases discussed
here. First, the case was based on the former Bankruptcy Act, which
did not define "claim" as the current Bankruptcy Code does. Second,
CERCLA had not even been enacted when the bankruptcy petition
was filed or the debtor's discharge was granted. The court held that
because CERCLA had not yet been enacted, the plaintiffs could not
have presented their cause of action against the debtor prior to the
date of "consummation. '"m Although this case was unusual, it could
be a preview of future cases involving bankruptcy plans long since
confirmed or debtors discharged.
Some cases have permitted environmental claims to be asserted
long after the debtor was "discharged" in bankruptcy even when it
was impossible or very unlikely for the claimants to know of their
claims. These cases do not, however, address the issue of due process,
which is sometimes raised in connection with a lack of notice followed
by a bankruptcy discharge.- 9
In re Jensen20 considered the question of when a claim based upon
certain environmental statutes arises. Robert and Rosemary Jensen
were potentially liable for environmental harm caused by their lumber
company's manufacturing process. In December 1983, the lumber company filed a Chapter 11 proceeding after its primary lender demanded
payment on all outstanding loans. In January 1984, the state's regional
water quality control board inspected the company site and notified
the Jensens of a hazardous waste problem at the site.-, The Jensens
filed joint voluntary petitions under Chapter 7 less than two weeks
after they received the notice.A2 The Jensens did not indicate in their
schedule of liabilities any claim for hazardous waste cleanup.243 The
DHS, the state equivalent of the EPA, undertook the cleanup.The corporate bankruptcy was converted to Chapter 7 in March
1984.24 The DHS oversaw the removal of a tank containing toxic
substances.?6 In July 1984, the Jensens were discharged in their Chap-

238. Id. at 167-68.
239. See, e.g., Union Scrap and Penn Central discussed supra text accompanying notes
220-25 and 236-38, respectively.
240. 127 B.R. 27 (9th Cir. 1991).
241. Id. at 28, 33.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 33.
246. Id. at 34.
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209

ter 7 case.2 47 The EPA became involved when it discovered that "per-

sons unknown" had removed certain portions of a tank.z 8 In 1987, the
corporate Chapter 7 was closed. In March 1987, the DHS notified

Robert Jensen that he was responsible individually for the cleanup at

the site.A9 In June 1988, a division of the DHS assessed Jensen's share

of the cleanup responsibility at ten percent of the total costs. 0
In April 1989, the Jensens brought an adversary proceeding, asserting that the state's cleanup claim was discharged in their individual
bankruptcy.2 51 The cleanup had been performed by the state agency
pursuant to state environmental statutes. 2 As in Chateaugay,Hubler,
and Union Scrap, the state agency argued that the claim did not
"arise" until the agency had "incurred costs for hazardous waste
cleanup." ' - Specifically, the agency argued that there can be no "right
to payment," until the agency has a right to payment under the appropriate substantive environmental law. Further, that right to payment
does not accrue until the agency incurs cleanup costs.2- The court was
concerned that once a state agency or the EPA is aware of a debtor's
financial situation, it might delay cleaning up in order to claim that
its right to payment or "claim" is post-petition.2

247. Id. at 28, 33.
248. Id. at 34.
249. Id. Later a notice was also sent to Robert Jensen telling him that he was jointly
responsible with the owners of the property for the site cleanup. The site had been leased by
the Jensens. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 28, 34.
252. Id. at 28.
253. Id. at 30.
254. Id. The court noted that this theory is similar to the theory developed in In re
Frenville, 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985), which held that a
claim based on an indemnity action did not arise until after the bankruptcy proceeding was filed
since the primary action on which the indemnity action was based had been commenced post-petition against the claimant. The court in Jensen pointed out that the Frenville decision has been
severely criticized, id. at 1185, but noted that the court in Union Scrap reached a similar result
although it did not rely on Frenville.
255. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 31. The court also distinguished cases based upon a private cause
of action under CERCLA, i.e., cases in which one party sought to recoup cleanup expenses or
seek contribution from another responsible party under CERCLA such as Levin Metals Corp.
v. Parr-Richman Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1986); Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc.
v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1450-52 (S.D. Fla. 1984). The court distinguished these
cases because they involved the right of one private party to recover against another outside
of bankruptcy and purely under CERCLA. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 30. They did not involve the
question of when a bankruptcy claim arises. Id. The court also distinguished cases that concerned
the question of whether a cleanup expense was an administrative expense such as In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 73 B.R. 494 (Bankr. D. Ma. 1987) and In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Co.,
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The Jensen court ultimately held that the claim arose at the time
of the debtor's conduct. The court said that this view "most closely
reflects legislative intent and finds the most support in the case law. "
The court was most persuaded by two mass tort cases2 7 the reasoning
of which the Chateaugaydistrict court followed.2 Further, the Jensen
court said this result would facilitate "the important bankruptcy goal
of providing a fresh start to the debtor and discourages manipulation
of the bankruptcy process."' 9 This result also discourages environmental agencies from delaying cleanup until a potential debtor in financial
trouble files bankruptcy so the cleanup claim may then be considered
a post-petition claim.
Finally, the Jensen court rejected the state's argument that environmental considerations should control. The court strongly believed
that it should not interfere in congressional decisions regarding
26
priorities in bankruptcy. 0
C.

Summary

Many courts have struggled to analyze the treatment of environmental obligations in bankruptcy. Both the definitional question of
whether a cleanup obligation is a "claim," and the timing question of
when it arose, have been treated inconsistently and confused by the
courts. This is due to the statute, the structure of the Bankruptcy
Code itself, and courts' beliefs regarding the purpose of the environmental laws and bankruptcy laws.
As suggested earlier, the statute as written raises two fundamental
questions regarding the treatment of environmental obligations in
bankruptcy. A comprehensive solution through revision of the Bankruptcy Code would be appropriate. Such a solution might be to discharge all past obligations, including equitable obligations. This would

831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987). Jensen, 27 B.R. at 31. Although these cases in effect treated the
the cleanup claims as post-petition since they were-granted administrative expense priority, the
cases did not address the definition of "claim" or when the claim arises. Id. For a brief discussion
of the relationship between the timing issue and the question of whether an obligation is an
"administrative expense," see supra note 122 and accompanying text and notes 53-54.
256. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 31. The court cited In re Johns-Manville Corp, 57 B.R. 680 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re A.H. Robbins Co., 63 B.R. 986 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); In re Chateaugay
Corp. (LTV), 112 B.R. 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); accord In re Hudson Oil Co., 100 B.R. 72,
77 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989).
257. See supra note 256.
258. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 32.
259. Id. at 33.
260. Id. at 1187 (citing In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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return to the earlier definition of "claim," which included purely equitable obligations. Or the solution might be to except certain obligations
from discharge, to give them priority, or both. A legislative solution
would be preferable to leaving the question for piecemeal and inconsistent solutions by courts forced to apply the Bankruptcy Code sections to situations that the drafters did not envision.
V.

FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS

This article suggests examining environmental claims in bankruptcy
by asking certain fundamental questions: Is the obligation a "claim"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code? If so, when did the claim
"arise"? This final section suggests an overall fundamental framework
based on the preceding exploration.
All environmental obligations can be divided into three basic
categories, with several subcategories. The basic categories are based
on three possible factual situations: (1) the past act with no future
consequence; (2) the past act with future consequences; and (3) the
future act of pollution-not simply the failure to clean up. The four
subcategories concern the four possible remedies, not all of which are
applicable to each factual setting: (1) the obligation which has been
reduced to money; (2) the obligation with an express alternative right
to money (but which has not been reduced to money); (3) the obligation
with no express alternative right to money; and (4) the pure injunction
against future pollution. These twelve alternatives encompass the possible combinations of act and remedy. For each combination, we can
determine whether the obligation is a "claim" and when it "arose," so
as to decide how to treat the obligation during and following bankruptcy. The following charts show the results; an explanation of each
category follows. Because the outcome also depends on whether the
debtor was the owner or operator of the property at the time of the
petition, there are two charts: one for Debtor/Owners and one for
Debtor/Non-Owners.
A. The past act (pre-petition)with no future (post-petition)consequences.
1. Obligation which has been reduced to a money obligation. Example: (a) Government has already performed a cleanup and sought reimbursement from the polluter; (b) Government has not yet cleaned up
but has assessed costs and billed for cleanup.
2. Express mixed remedy. Example: CERCLA system of right to
order cleanup or, alternatively, to perform the cleanup and seek reimbursement.
3. Non-express mixed remedy. Example: the government has the
right only to order a cleanup, but non-bankruptcy law (usually state
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law) allows the government to pursue the debtor to enforce the injunction and effectively to control the debtor's assets. This was the situation in the Kovacs case.
4. Pure injunction. Example: order to discontinue pollution in the
future.
Example "1" is a claim and it arose in the past (pre-petition).
Example "2" is a claim also. It fits squarely within section 101(5)(B).
Because this category of obligations has no future consequences, even
the Chateaugaycourt would consider this obligation a "claim." Because
"1" and "2" are "claims" and arose pre-petition, they are dischargeable.
Example "3" is a claim under the Kovacs case, at least where the
government already has been granted some control over the debtor's
assets to enforce the injunction. However, if the government has not
been granted some kind of relief to enforce the order, one can distinguish Kovacs and argue that this obligation is not a claim. Under
Kovacs, "3" is a "claim," and is dischargeable. Since there are no
future consequences the obligation arose pre-petition. Because "1,"
"2," and "3" are "claims" that arose pre-petition, they are dischargeable. However, one must look further to the environmental statutes.
The "claim" against the debtor arose pre-petition and is dischargeable.
But we must recognize that if the estate owns the property post-petition, it has a current obligation to clean it up, an obligation that can
be enforced by the government. If the estate is not the owner, the
estate (or debtor-in-possession) has no continuing liability since this
category has no future effects.
Example "4" does not exist since this category is "past act with
no future consequences."
B. The past act (pre-petition) with future (post-petition) consequences.
1. Obligation which has been reduced to a money obligation. Example: (a) Government has already performed a cleanup and has sought
reimbursement from the polluter; (b) Government has not yet cleaned
up but has assessed costs and billed for cleanup.
2. Express mixed remedy. Example: CERCLA system of right to
order cleanup or, alternatively, to perform the cleanup and seek reimbursement.
3. Non-express mixed remedy. Example: the government has the
right only to order, but non-banlkruptcy law (usually state law) allows
the government to pursue the debtor to enforce the injunction and
effectively to control the debtor's assets. This was the situation in the
Kovacs case.
4. Pure injunction. Example: order to discontinue pollution in the
future.
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Example "1(a)" cannot exist as the property has been cleaned up
and has no future consequences. Example "1(b)" is a claim, and it
arises pre-petition. Example "2" is a claim, although here the
Chateaugay court would disagree. The Chateaugay court would say
that if the continued pollution creates harm and the government orders
cleanup (rather than exercising its right to cleanup and seek reimbursement), the obligation is not a claim.
As discussed earlier, the clearer view is to consider the obligation
a "claim" but determine its status regarding discharge based on the
timing issue.21 That is, if (1) the debtor-now estate-continues to
own the property and is liable for cleanup as the current owner, or
(2) to the extent that future consequences occur as a result of the
continued contamination, even if the estate is not the current owner,
the obligation arises anew every day. As a post-petition, or post-confirmation claim, its dischargeability is limited. Example "3" is arguably
a "claim" under Kovacs, subject to the same limitations mentioned
above. This is because the Kovacs Court carefully avoided deciding
whether the obligation would be a "claim" if the government had not
actually had a receiver appointed, dispossessed the debtor, and essentially sought money. As in example "2," the obligation in example "3"
can be said to arise every day and is thus post-petition. Example "4,"
the order prohibiting pollution in the future, does not exist in a category of "past acts" with future consequences.
C. FutureActs, Future Pollution
1. This category cannot exist. The types of orders in "1" are divided
at past acts not future acts.
2. Express mixed remedy. Example: CERCLA system of right to
order cleanup or, alternatively, to perform the cleanup and seek reimbursement.
3. Non-express mixed remedy. Example: the government has the
right only to order a cleanup, but non-bankruptcy law (usually state
law) allows the government to pursue the debtor to enforce the injunction and effectively to control the debtor's assets. This was the situation in the Kovacs case.
4. Pure injunction. Example: order to discontinue pollution in the
future.
Example "1" does not exist. Examples "2" and "3" arguably do not
exist since they concern orders diiected to clean up, that is, orders
directed to remedy a past act. One could argue, however, that the
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failure to clean up is itself a future act and an order directing clean
up can thus be aimed at a future act. In such a case, the obligation
is a claim but one subject to the ]imitations or glosses supplied by the
courts in Chateaugay and Kovacs, regarding example "2" and "3"
respectively. However, none of these claims is dischargeable in bankruptcy if the act giving rise to the obligation has not yet occurred.
That is, since the act "arises" in the future, it is not governed by the
bankruptcy process. Example "4" is not a claim and also has not yet
arisen. It too is not subject to the bankruptcy process.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The two key bankruptcy questions of whether a particular environmental obligation is a "claim" and when it "arose" are interrelated.
These two questions form the basis for determining which obligations
will be subject to in a bankruptcy proceeding and which are dischargeable. They come to us from a simpler time, a time before extensive
mass torts and environmental liabilities.
Yet, to have a clear focus on problems presented at the intersection
of environmental and bankruptcy law, it is necessary to address each
of these two questions separately. Courts will continue to decide these
cases unless and until Congress takes some action. Therefore, courts
must engage in a detailed statutory analysis in every case and parties
must base their arguments on such an analysis.
When Congress reconsiders the bankruptcy law, it should consider
how to integrate contemporary problems such as environmental
liabilities into the bankruptcy system.
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